Metaphysics of concepts in analytic philosophy

There is a problem of conceptual inconsistency in analytic philosophy. That problem is complex or composite, and its decision mainly depends on how we define basic terms used in discussion: individual concept, extension and intension of concept, meaning, sense and others. Apparently, we could define these terms by means of logics, but modern logics has different interpretations of them. Moreover, the term 'concept' is unclear, as well as its metaphysical (ontological and epistemological) status - that is the question of concept structure, correlation with language etc. On the one hand, we could define concepts as mental representations, on the other - as expressions of language (primarily, natural). Accordingly, there are (at least) two points of view on concepts: mentalism and lingua-centrism. Mentalism is a starting point for the most of investigations in contemporary cognitive science; in particular, someone could identify concepts with states of nervous system. Lingua-centrism describes concepts as signs (words, word-combination etc.), meanings of which we precise in every day communication. The question is that: whether we can fix (localize in the brain) such entities as concepts if they are mental representations. The answer is rather 'No' than 'Yes', because a process of concept formation is continuous.

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