Scientific habitus: unity of differences

The article suggests the author's understanding of the subjective basis of science as a form of social practice. It is argued that an adequate conceptual resource to describe the subject of scientific practice is the notion of «scientific habitus». The notion of «scientific habitus» gives an opportunity to overcome the traditional oppositions, such as corporeal/spiritual, conscious/unconscious, social/cognitive, individual/collective, and to describe heterogeneity and inhomogeneity of the subjective basis of science in integrity and unity. The structure of scientific habitus is represented by the unity of cognitive, behavioral, value and emotional dispositions. The proposed typology of the dispositional structure of scientific habit basis meets modern perceptions formed in psychology and social theory, as well as the traditions of the philosophical analysis of science. It is proved that the heterogeneity of the disposi-tional structure of scientific habit basis is a source of its diversity, creates a functional intensity and the variety of scientific practice. The selection of cognitive dispositions in the habit basis of scientific practice is caused by two conditions: firstly, the existence of philosophical tradition to make a difference between cognitive and value aspects; secondly, the occurrence of cognitive «turn». The cognitive dispositions form the cognitive basis of scientific practice, and their analysis indicates the diversity of forms. However, the inhomogeneity of cognitive dispositions doesn't exclude their system organization represented, for example, by ontological and epistemological category grids. The substantial variety of cognitive dispositions is shown by an example of theoretical sociology. The implementation of cognitive dispositions in communicative forms makes it possible to introduce the notion of «scien-tific linguistic habitus». It is shown that the variety of behavioral dispositions is embodied in the existence of different typologies: strategies of subversion and conservation (P. Bourdieu), revolutionary, standard, pragmatic, creative configurations (L. Thevenot), attainable, adaptive, regressive and destructive strategies (T. I. Zaslavsky). The value dispositions are understood as a form of intentional structure of a subject represented by attitude to certain objects and phenomena. The assumption has been made that the introduction of the notion of «moral habitus» understood as a mode of practical dispositions, which have an ethical orientation, to the analysis of the subjective basis of scientific practice is possible. The emotional dispositions are interpreted as a significant component of the habit basis of scientific practice. At the substantial level the emotional dispositions may be represented by involvement and distance, competition and cooperation, intension and relaxation. The involvement can be expressed in two forms: the involvement of people and things and the mutual involvement of people. It is emphasized that there is no possibility to receive an absolute answer about the existence of a direct causal link between different types of dispositions. It is concluded that the introduction of the notion of «scientific habitus» offers a more capacious vision of the subjective basis of science and requires a detailed research work to restore the network of dependencies and the relations of a subject with the world around.

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