Metaphors and meaningless expressions: about genesis the problem of metaphors in the analytical philosophy

In the article considers question about the origins and factors of formation of the metaphorical problematics in the analytical philosophy. I don't agree that the problem of the analysis of metaphors originated in the pre-war period of analytical philosophy. This view, for example, can be detect (found) in the article Nikonenko (see his article «Analytical interpretation of metaphor»). I think, that researchers , who take this point of view , do not distinguish between the problem of meaningless expressions and, something similar to it, problems of metaphorical using of language. Since the problem of meaningless expressions really originated in the prewar period of analytical philosophy, it might seem that the problem of metaphor originated in the pre-war period too. But it's not true. The problem of metaphor is a completely special research topic. Metaphors cannot be reduced to a meaningless expressions and, so, the problem of metaphorical using of language cannot be reduced to a problem of the meaningless expressions. Metaphor is specifically linguistic phenomenon. its specificity in the fact that metaphors have two structural elements - literal and, conditionally, non-literal (for example, implied). We can call them, for example - «literal meaning» and «implied sense» , "tenor" and "vehicle, «metaphor's focus» and «frame», etc. It is believed, that metaphors do not refer to non-linguistic objects and, thus, they are kind of empty names. But why they often are used in naming of phenomena (objects) that have not yet designations in language? Why are metaphors used in science and philosophy, including in analytical philosophy? For example, we can remember metaphors in the theory of Russell - «logical atom», «molecular sentence» . Vitgensteins metaphors : «the logical picture of the world» , «the world of facts» , «language as border of thinking» and so on. Marguerite La Caze in her «The Analytic Imaginary» also writes about metaphors, that used in analytical philosophy . Can we then say that metaphors are kind of empty names , which, moreover, must be eliminated from strictly language? This position is dangerous to themselves analytical theories - for example, the conception of the logical athomism. It turns out that it consists of empty names? What to do in this case Russell or Vitgenstein? I think, analytics should to consider metaphors more carefully and deeply and we must understand , that metaphors have many different and useful for science functions. However, this happened in the postwar period in the genesis of analytic philosophy.

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