In defense of naive semantics and its objects
The aim of this paper is to explore how from an early age a person acquires an intuitive ideas about what are the thought and language, and how they relate to each other. The sum of intuitions of this kind can be called naive semantics, which is often one of the main targets for philosophical criticism. The overall objective of the paper is to show that such criticism is largely underestimates the value of naive semantics for our intellectual development and cognition, and that it usually incorrectly describes the origins of naive semantics. In particular, the use of mentalistic idioms that characterize naive semantics is not a secondary or parasitic functioning of language, but a necessary and preliminary step in mastering of abstract, including scientific, concepts.
Keywords
holism,
mentalism,
propositional attitudes,
naive semantics,
холизм,
ментализм,
пропозициональные установки,
наивная семантикаAuthors
| Rogonyan Garris S. | Saint-Petersburg School of Social Sciences and Humanities | rogonyan@gmail.com; grogonyan@hse.ru |
Всего: 1
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