Truth and Rationality | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2016. № 4(36). DOI: 10.17223/1998863X/36/1

Truth and Rationality

This paper is about the pragmatic notion of truth, according to which what we believe in the ideal limit of inquiry is true. Hence, it refers to the dynamics of belief and thus to theoretical rationality. Thereby, truth and rationality are inexorably entangled; neither can be explained without the other. The paper intends to make plausible that this entanglement may be developed into rigorous and fruitful theory.

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Keywords

rationality, the dynamics of belief, the pragmatic notion of truth, рациональность, динамика веры, прагматическая понятие истины

Authors

Name	Organization	E-mail
Spohn Wolfgang	University of Constanz	wolfgang.spohn@uni-konstanz.de

Всего: 1

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