Conceivable and possible in light of the limits of intellect

The article discusses the question of a ratio conceivable and possible. The proposed solution is in recognition of an inevitable divergence between what can be conceivable as possible and what is possible actually. This rupture of conceivable and possible is explained by existing limits of human intellect. The limits of human intellect can be expressed in categories of J. Hintikka who considers the sphere of logical through a prism of epis-temic agent with limited information, and divides in this regard surface information and depth information. In the context of the epistemic agent with limited information transition from conceivable to logically possible, used in modal arguments of various type is wrong. In article criticized the zombie argument of D. Chalmers as an example of a similar mistake. The idea of the impossible possible worlds (Hintikka) is interpreted by the author in a spirit the necessity of selection special, not actually existing objects which inevitably (similarly transcendental illusion of Kant) designed by the finite epistemic agent at the level of superficial information. The idea of depth information is interpreted in the context of classical concept of infinite intellect, and also through differentiation of truth of the reason and truth of the fact (G. Leibniz). The question of the special substantial a priori determined by semantics of language is also raised in article. The idea of similar semantic a priori seems to the author more perspective, than classical idea of synthetic a priori (I. Kant). That idea also is attracted for an explanation of the nature of mathematics and philosophy. In this regard there is an interpretation of logic and mathematics as tools of the finite epistemic agent. Instrumental interpretation allows us to consider the logic and math independently of normative or descriptive functions. The article discusses the necessary connection of semantics of the possible worlds with ontological (or metaphysical) postulates which is generated by the fact that the universe of the possible worlds is determined by conceptual means of the accepted language and therefore depends on its conceptual a priori. Division of the Chalmers primary and secondary intensional criticized as the division which is not considering a role of the epistemic agent. In view of the finiteness of the knower, it becomes problematic a concept of «primary intensional», and after it should be revised the idea of two-level semantics as dependent on ontological prerequisites of some language.

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