A holistic assumptions in the third argument of Gorgias' treatise "On non-being"

In this paper we continue to analyze Gorgias' argumentation in the third argument of the treatise "On Non-Being". We denote the benefits for the interpretation of this argument can arose, if we accept the suggestion that Gorgias implicitly use (in the third argument of "On Non-Being", apud De Melisso Xenophane Gorgia, VI, §§ 23-26; it is grounded here that the content of one man's thought cannot be communicate to another man) a holistic understanding of a whole. We offer an interpretation of Gor-gias' argument here, in which he proves two theses: I. Different subjects cannot comprehend the same internal intentional object (§§ 23, 25); and II. Different subjects cannot comprehend the same real intentional object (§ 24). We suggested that in II. Gorgias implicitly exploited the two assumptions that could be used by Parmenides in his poem - in some arguments against plurality of being. The first assumption asserts the identity of an intentional act and its object, and the second one - the indistinguishable of such a objects which cannot exist (be thought of, be comprehended) without each other. Furthermore, both in I. and II. the third assumption is used: a whole or a complex object is a holistic one - i.e. its constituents are determined by each other, and so they cannot exist without each other. Our interpretation helps to reveal the significant logical connection between Gorgias' arguments under consideration and some statements in Parmenides' poem, and also Protagoras' thesis that man is the measure of all things. In this aspect our interpretation is different from A. Mourelatos' interpretation, who rejects that Gorgias relies on Protagoras' thesis. Moreover, our interpretation of §§ 23-26 makes Gorgias' reasoning in each thesis of the third argument uniform one and treats it as proceeding from the same principles - in contrast to A. Mourelatos' approach.

Keywords

Authors

References