The fragile incorrigibility of the introspection of phenomenal beliefs

The aim of this article is to criticize David Chalmers' incorrigibility thesis, which holds that a direct phenomenal belief cannot be false. In order to maintain his claim, Chalmers distinguishes three types of phenomenal concepts - relational phenomenal concepts, demonstrative phenomenal concepts and pure phenomenal concepts. According to Chalmers, pure phenomenal concepts do not pick out phenomenal properties relationally or indexically as do relational phenomenal concepts and demonstrative phenomenal concepts. Instead, they pick them out directly, in terms of their intrinsic phenomenal nature. Chalmers also distinguishes two subtypes of pure phenomenal concepts - direct phenomenal concepts and standing phenomenal concepts. Direct phenomenal concepts, which underlie direct phenomenal beliefs, can be formed by a subject only in presence of an object with phenomenal properties and only if she directs her attention to them. Standing phenomenal concepts can be formed by memory. Chalmers assumes that direct phenomenal concepts can be described as phenomenal concepts, which are partly constituted by underlying phenomenal qualities. He also insists on the existence of a special intimate connection between a direct phenomenal concept and its content - the phenomenal quality. This specific intimate connection makes the phenomenal concept's representation of its content incorrigibly accurate. Moreover he describes the introspective access to a direct phenomenal belief (at heart of which there is a direct phenomenal concept) as an immediate, non-relational connection, which he names by the Russellian term "acquaintance." First, the article tries to show that] the idea of there being a special connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties, along with the idea of acquaintance, makes Chalmers' incorrigibility thesis weak, for these two ideas remain unexplained in his current description of this thesis. Moreover, because of their mysterious meaning, they most likely cannot be explained in the future. Second the article points out that the specific immediate connection between direct phenomenal concepts and phenomenal properties seems inexplicable, because of the meaning of the word "concept," which presupposes that any concept -relational or not - picks out only certain features of the object and cannot grasp all its details. Third, the article challenges the incorrigible accuracy of the representation of content in direct phenomenal concepts in the light of modern theories of consciousness, according to which phenomenal experience is illusory. Finally the article draws attention to the fact that even if direct phenomenal beliefs are indeed incorrigible, it remains unclear how they can enrich philosophical and psychological studies of consciousness as long as their content is so private. The first objection is, I think, the most serious one.

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