Argument against constitutive panpsychism

The argument that I'm going to represent tries to refute panpsychism not tending to criticize the principles of Chalmers' philosophy; it's derived from the truth of these principles. It's primarily based on the article «Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism» and on the second chapter of "the Conscious mind", which is regarded as the most crucial non-physical intuitions. Chalmers 'panpsychism rests on several ssumptions: 1. The conceivability argument is sound. 2. The causal argument is sound. 3. Consciousness is causally relevant. The basis of the conceivability argument is a two-dimensional semantics. Another basis of the conceivability argument Is the position that any metaphysical possibility implies logical possibility. The basis for the causal argument is the principle of the causal closure of the physical.The basis for the causal efficacy of consciousness is an attempt to close the "explanatory gap" arising out of the first two arguments. The basis of consciousness in the case of panpsychism is protophenomenal properties. Protophenomenal properties: 1. Run physical functions and are a kind of intrinsic properties. 2. Fully or partially constitute consciousness, as the constitution can transmit the causal relevance from protophenomenal properties to consciousness. 3. They are not phenomenal, as this would lead to the absurd position that the mower or dirty socks have consciousness. So look at these steps: 1. If the "phenomenal feel" is not the primary and the secondary intensions of the term "consciousness" at the same time, then the conceivability argument is false. 2. Consciousness is constituted by special combination of protophenomenal properties. 3. In every possible world replica of this combination implies the existence of consciousness. 4. Hence, the combination of protophenomenal properties is the secondary intension of the term "consciousness". 5. Protophenomenal properties are not phenomenal. 6. Hence, the secondary intension of the term "consciousness" is not "a phenomenal feel". 7. Therefore, the conceivability argument is unsound. As we can see, the concept of constitutive panpsychism leads to the denial of its base. This does not mean the falsity of constitutive panpsychism, but nevertheless constitutive panpsychism needs deep metaphysical clarifications.

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