H. Kelsen's relativism and Plato's "basic legislative principle

This research is devoted to the analysis of the juridical relativism and its grounds in H. Kelzen's philosophy of law, presented in A. Didikin's article "Hans Kelzen's Philosophy of Law: relativism and rethinking of causality". H. Kelzen's principle of normativism ("pure theory of law") is analyzed in the context of Plato's "basic principle of legislation" on the basis of normative dogmatism of the latter. The authors came to the conclusion that the principle of legal relativism and principle of normative dogmatism are an essential unity, as norm dogmatism as an essential form structuring social context undergoes constant changes, which are determined by convention. In the contemporary philosophy of law the idea of normativism as "pure doctrine of law" (Kel-zen) is one of the acute and demanded in connection with the problem of interaction of following the rule and norm interpretation. H. Kelzen's principle of relativism can be considered as one of the possible variants of Plato's normative dogmatism, which is apparently based on the principle of normative syncretism. That is why, H/ Kelsen refers accidents, misfortunes, fate, chance to principle of causality. Hence, normative syncretism is a state of Subject's legal consciousness, which preceded segregation of principle of causality, which determined eligibility both of legal relativism and of normative dogmatism conditioned by norm archetype: there must be that (it is not important what) what is appropriate. Also, the authors formulate and prove the supposition that the dichotomy of being and obligation is the main condition of legal norm existent. Comparing Plato's approach to legislative organization, its role in state's existence and H. Kelsen's conception of legislation the authors analyzed the idea of the international legacy in the context of international war and state's independence.

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