Philosophy of mind through the prism of the language analysis: from the metaphysics to the narrative

In this paper, we discuss the relationships between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The central thesis is that the philosophy of mind loses its metaphysical and mentalistic character when one applies the method of language analysis to the crucial problems in the philosophy of mind. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the interpretation of R. Descartes’ attitude to the language. Contrary to the traditional view on his philosophy of mind as a mentalism, we argue that R. Descartes treats linguistic capacity of humans as a true criterion for the attribution of mental states. Animals and human-like machines lack the genuine language, which means that they do not have minds. Such interpretation of R. Descartes’ philosophy expresses the idea of «linguisticity» of mind opposite to the tradition of mentalism. The second part examines D. Dennett’s heterophenomenological method. According to him, heterophenomenology is a unique way of taking the first person point of view seriously and rejecting metaphysic entities behind it. Heterophenomenology is ontologically neutral and focuses on the narratives told by humans. The narratives are linguistic constructions that are socially embedded. Thus, D. Dennett’s heterophenomenological method attempts to explain mind and consciousness through the language analysis. The third part is concerned with B. Russell’s account of the relationships between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. Two interpretations of these relationships are possible. The first one is based on the widely accepted belief about the method of analytic philosophy. The second one adds an ontological component to the first interpretation. This component presupposes that the stuff of the world is neither mental nor material. Such ontological presupposition allows to reject mentalism, and B. Russell’s philosophy of language includes his philosophy of mind. We conclude by presenting two main results of the application of the method of language analysis in the philosophy of mind. The first one is that philosophy of mind loses its metaphysical and mentalistic character because of application of this method. The second one is that although the method of language analysis resolves metaphysical problems, it brings problems from the philosophy of language into the theory of mind. This happens due to the method is formulated within a particular philosophy of language with its own limitations.

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