Political and socio-economic factors of transfers distribution to Russian regions (2002-2015)
In the introduction the author demonstrates the differences in budget transfers between regions in the Russian Federation that proves the topicality of this issue. The author discusses the different strategies which politician can choose. The basic ones are: the support of “core” voters (the strategy of friends’ support) and the support of “swing” voters (the strategy of pacifying opponents). The methodological part of the work is presented by correlations and regression analysis. We use the data of 55 Russian regions with several factors. As budget transfers we took the sum of budget additions into the regions corrected on the amount of people living in the region. As social and economic factors the average income, the change of gross regional product and the unemployment were taken. It is rather significant for regression model to have a homogeneity data, therefore, we took a logarithm from the transfers average income. Political factors are presented by the percent of votes for “United Russia” on parliamentary elections and for V.V. Putin on presidential elections. The results show us the positive and significant relation between the sum of transfers and political loyalty. The influence of the elections is increasing with their forthcoming, is holding during the presidential elections and decreases right after them. Although the last parliamentary elections showed the weakness of this relation. The linkage of socio-economic characteristics and budget transfers presents the support of less developed regions, with high unemployment rate and low average income. It is logically based decision to support someone who can’t maintain with the financial problems by himself. The results of regression analysis revealed the more significant role of unemployment rate. This factor is the first one to decide in which region we should send money. Among parliamentary and presidential elections we fix the stronger influence of presidential voting before 2008. After this year we see the larger impact of parliamentary elections.
Keywords
elections,
redistribution of budget transfers,
regression analysis,
регрессионный анализ,
выборы,
распределение бюджетных трансфертовAuthors
| Kamolikova Valeriia R. | National Research University Higher School of Economics | vkamolikova@hse.ru |
Всего: 1
References
Выборы, референдумы и иные формы волеизъявления [Электронный ресурс] / Центральная избирательная комиссия РФ. Электрон. дан. М., [б.г.]. URL: http://www. vy-bory.izbirkom.ru/region/izbirkom (дата обращения: 30.07.2017).
Объем валового регионального продукта на душу населения [Электронный ресурс] // Единая межведомственная информационно-статистическая система (ЕМИСС). Г осударственная статистика: гос. информ. ресурс. Электрон. дан. М., [б.г.]. URL: https://www. fedstat.ru/indicator/51645 (дата обращения: 29.07.2017).
Регионы России. Социально-экономические показатели - 2016 г. [Электронный ресурс] / Федеральная служба государственной статистики. Электрон. дан. URL: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b16_14p/Main.htm (дата обращения: 29.07.2017).
Ахременко А.С., Петров А.П. Влияние системы перераспределения общественных ресурсов на экономическую эффективность, поддержку власти и социальное неравенство: к динамической математической модели [Электронный ресурс] // XII Всероссийское совещание по проблемам управления. ВСПУ-2014. Москва, 16-19 июня 2014 г.: Труды. Электрон. дан. М.: Институт проблем управления им. В.А. Трапезникова РАН, 2014. С. 6170-6182. 1 DVD-ROM.
Marques II I., Nazrullaeva E., Yakovlev A.A. Substituting Distribution for Growth:The Political Logic of Intergovernmental Transfers in the Russian Federation // Economics and Politics. 2016. Vol. 28, No. 1. P. 23-54.
Nordhaus W. The Political Business Cycle // Review of Economic Studies. 1975. Vol. 42 (2). P. 169-190.
Стародубцев А.В. Политическая лояльность или экономическая эффективность? Политические и социально-экономические факторы распределения межбюджетных трансфертов в России: Препринт М-02/09. СПб.: Издательство Европейского университета в Санкт-Петербурге, 2009. 28 с.
Vaishnav M., Sircar N. Core or swing? The role of electoral context in shaping pork barrel [Electronic resource] // Working Paper. 2012. Electronic data. URL: https://nsircar. files.wordpress.com/2013/02/vaishnav_sircar_03-12-12.pdf (access date: 03.02. 2016).
Ansolabehere S., Snyder J.M. Party control of state government and the distribution of public expenditures // Scandanavian Jounal of Economics. 2006. Vol. 108 (4). P. 547-569.
Dixit A., Londregan J. The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics // The Journal of Politics. 1996. Vol. 58, No. 4. P. 1132-1155.
Cox G., McCubbins M. Electoral politics in a redistributive game // The Journal of Politics. 1986. Vol. 48, No. 2. P. 370-389.
Артоболевский С.С. Региональная политика, направленная на снижение территориальных экономических и социальных диспропорций в Российской Федерации: проект концепции // Регион: экономика и социология. 2001. № 1. С. 4-34.
Lindbeck A., Weibull J.W. Balanced budget redistribution and the outcome of political competition // Public Choice. 1987. Vol. 52 (3). P. 273-297.
Marques II I., Nazrullaeva E., Yakovlev A. A. From Competition to Dominance: Political Determinations of Federal Transfers in Russian Federation // NRU Higher School of Economics. Series EC «Economics». 2011. No. 12. 49 p.
