On rationality and justification

Traditionally, until today, rationality is associated with justification based on logic. This model set a paradigm for understanding the science as knowledge of causes using reasons. However, this way of explicating rationality encourages irrationalism, giving it too much space. The author claims that discursive rationality is only, in fact, a particular area of rationality. If we took as irrational what has no justification, then the region of the irrational would expand to enormous proportions. The emphasis on such an understanding of rationality gives an unjustified advantage to the epistemic-technical model of reason to the detriment of other models and reduces rationality to scientific rationality. In turn, it is vulnerable to criticism (Feyerabend), which puts irrationality in a favorable light. The term "justification" can be in the theoretical and practical contexts, as well as subjective and objective ones. These types of justifications correlate with models of rationality (epistemic, instrumental, practical-communicative), each of which relies on some assumption of what rationality is. The author singles out the formal and material criteria of rationality, pointing out that the material bases of rationality cannot be given a priori. Therefore, the importance of formal (logical) justification rules becomes clear, which in principle are fallible, gives us hope for clarifying the concept of rationality. However, such attempts will nevertheless be circular in the strict sense, since formal criteria of justification refer, in turn, back to rationality. For the possibility of understanding rationality, we have first to assume our rationality as a capacity to act, to know and understand in general, and in particular the ability to clarify the concept of rationality. Rationality in general cannot be explicated, but only every time its concrete historical manifestation, which can be conditionally called a priori. The variability of the reason is an indication of the openness of the concept of rationality itself, which must be developed in the future theory of rationality. The fundamental sign of such rationality is the reflexivity of our thinking. The author distinguishes the dispositional (individuals, groups, institutions) and non-dispositional (arguments, norms, etc.) types of rationality. A broad sense of rationality is singled out, when an action or argument in general can be candidates for discursive scrutiny and a narrow sense, when an action or argument turn out to be the best. Rationality in a broad sense is the clarity of an action or speech act, and what cannot be understood is not rational.

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