Interpretation of cognitive activity in the phenomenological hermeneutic perspective

The problem of the article can be formulated in the form of a question about how the concept of the status of cognitive activity in modern phenomenological hermeneutic philosophy changes? It is established that in the modern hermeneutic philosophy there is an ontologization of the communicative dimension. Language and communication are attributed the status of necessary conditions of cognition. Different aspects of the language dimension are articulated in different projects of modern hermeneutics. Thus, in formal pragmatics, the social function of language is articulated; communication appears as something that generates social matter and ensures the coordination of actions of all participants in one life world. In transcendental pragmatics, the epistemological aspect of language and communication is articulated; language is attributed a transcendental status in the Kantian sense, that is, it is a necessary condition for knowledge and the condition that ensures the acquisition of general knowledge. A phenomenological hermeneutic position allows us to combine the principles of validity and performative orientation in cognition, since it discovers structures that generate intersubjective significance of knowledge in communication. The structures cannot be identified from the position of a third person, that is, from the perspective of an external observer, because they are actualized only in the perspective of a participant in communicative interaction. In the phenomenological hermeneutic perspective, the basis for the universality and objectivity of cognition is the situation of communicative interaction. In the conditions of overcoming the idea of an autonomous transcendental subject, the concept of the essence of the process of cognition also changes. The opposition of the subject and the object is overcome; it is revealed that, firstly, our knowledge grows out of a certain "preconception" of the world, and, secondly, our essential belonging to it is a necessary condition for the very possibility of knowing the world. The importance of this transformation lies in the fact that these phenomena call into question traditional philosophical distinctions: for example, a distinction between the theoretical and the practical, which was based on the subject-object model of cognition. Our theoretical activity grows out of everyday practices and in one way or another is connected with the translation or transformation of the world of everyday life.

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