The truth about "truth"
Truthteller sentences (e.g. "This sentence is true") and sentences of the no-no paradox (e.g. "The following sentence is false" and "The previous sentence is false"), in contrast to Liar-like sentences (e.g. "This sentence is false"), have an excess of consistent unique truth values. This circumstance makes it possible to consider such sentences as examples of genuine semantic pathologies. The way to treat them can be found in the anaphoric prosentential theory of truth. This form of non-redundancy deflationism takes the notion of truth not as an ordinary predicate describing a certain real property, but as an anaphoric operator, which makes it possible to meaningfully substitute prosentences with its own antecedents. The anaphoric prosentential theory of truth interprets truthteller sentences and sentences of the no-no paradox as prosentences that lack propositional content. To treat semantic pathologies without imposing the ban on the use of any so-called "groundless" sentences, anaphoric existentialism should be supplemented with metalinguistic analysis. This way will make it possible to show that truthteller sentences and sentences of the no-no paradox actually do not ascribe any unique truth values, but they establish certain types of relations between the semantic content of such prosentences. The use of the words "is true" and "is false" has no purpose to tell us which unique truth values are possessed by these prosentences, but informs that between their possible antecedents there is a certain relation R; the relation determines whether or not these prosentences have the same value. Truthteller sentences can be consistent assumed only "is true"; sentences of the no-no paradox can take in only «is false». Therefore, the metalinguistic analysis of prosententional semantic content can serve as an effective way to eliminate excess of consistent unique truth values for truthteller sentences and sentences of the no-no paradox, and it does not require the ban of any so-called "groundless" sentences.
Download file
Counter downloads: 159
Keywords
парадокс лжеца, парадокс правдолюба, парадокс спорщика, анафора, дефляционизм, liar paradox, truthteller paradox, no-no paradox, anaphora, deflationismAuthors
| Name | Organization | |
| Nekhaev Andrei V. | Tyumen State University; Omsk State Technical University | A_V_Nehaev@rambler.ru |
References
Ладов В.А. Уроки «Лжеца» // Философия науки. 2011. № 3 (50). С. 37-53.
Ладов В.А. «Гераклит» Хайдеггера, aletheia и парадокс Лжеца // SCOLH. 2015. Vol. 9, № 2. С. 221-227.
Ладов В.А. Решение логических парадоксов в семантически замкнутом языке // Эпистемология и философия науки. 2017. Т. 52, № 2. С. 104-119. DOI: 10.5840/eps201752233.
Valpola V. Elementare Untersuchungen der Antinomien von Russell, Grelling-Nelson und Eu-bulides // Theoria. 1953. Vol. 19, № 3. P. 183-188. DOI: 10.1111/j. 1755-2567.1953.tb01018.x.
Gupta A. Truth and Paradox // Journal of Philosophical Logic. 1982. Vol. 11, № 1. P. 1-60. DOI: 10.1007/BF00302338.
Вригт Г.-Х. Гетерологический парадокс // Логико-философские исследования : Избранные труды. М. : Прогресс, 1986. С. 449-482.
Ладов В.А. Логические основания формального реализма // Вестник Томского государственного университета. 2010. № 341. С. 48-55.
Ладов В.А. Бесконечный Лжец // SCOLH. 2014. Vol. 8, № 2. С. 285-292.
Ладов В.А. Два аргумента в опровержение релятивизма в диалоге Платона «Теэтет» // SCOLH. 2016. Vol. 10, № 1. С. 205-213.
Mackie J.L. Truth, Probability and Paradox : Essays in Philosophical Logic. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1973. 305 p.
Kripke S. Outline of a Theory of Truth // The Journal of Philosophy. 1975. Vol. 72, № 19. P. 690-716. DOI: 10.2307/2024634.
Mortensen C., Priest G. The Truth Teller Paradox // Logique et Analyse. 1981. Vol. 24, № 95-96. P. 381-388.
Smith J.W. A Simple Solution to Mortensen and Priest's Truth Teller Paradox // Logique et Analyse. 1984. Vol. 27, № 106. P. 217-220.
Yablo S. Truth and Reflection // Journal of Philosophical Logic. 1985. Vol. 14, № 3. P. 297349. DOI: 10.1007/BF00249368.
Yablo S. Hop, Skip and Jump: The Agonistic Conception of Truth // Philosophical Perspectives. 1993. Vol. 7. P. 371-396. DOI: 10.2307/2214130.
Yablo S. New Grounds for Naive Truth Theory // Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox / Jc. Beall (ed.). Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2003. P. 312-330.
Wolenski J. Self-Reference and Rejection // Filozofia Nauki. 1993. Vol. 1, № 1. P. 89-102.
Goldstein L. 'This Statement Is Not True' Is not True // Analysis. 1992. Vol. 52, № 1. P. 1-5. DOI: 10.1093/analys/52.1.1.
Goldstein L. Circular Queue Paradoxes - the Missing Link // Analysis. 1999. Vol. 59, № 4. P. 284-290. DOI: 10.1093/analys/59.4.284.
Goldstein L. A Unified Solution to Some Paradoxes // Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 2000. Vol. 100, № 1. P. 53-74. DOI: 10.1111/1467-9264.00065
Goldstein L. Doubting Thomas: From Bradwardine Back to Anon // Unity, Truth and the Liar. The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox / S. Rahman, T. Tulenheimo, E. Genot (eds.). Dordrecht : Springer, 2008. P. 62-85.
Beall Jc. A Neglected Deflationist Approach to the Liar // Analysis. 2001. Vol. 61, № 2. P. 126-129. DOI: 10.1093/analys/61.2.126.
Sorensen R.A. Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. 200 p.
Sorensen R.A. A Definite No-No // Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox / Jc. Beall (ed.). Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2003. P. 225-229.
Read S. Symmetry and Paradox // History and Philosophy of Logic. 2006. Vol. 27, № 4. P. 307-318. DOI: 10.1080/01445340600593942.
Greenough P. Truthmaker Gaps and the No-No Paradox // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2011. Vol. 72, № 3. P. 547-563. DOI: 10.1111/j. 1933-1592.2011.00491.x.
Billon A. The Truth-Tellers Paradox // Logique et Analyse. 2013. Vol. 56, № 224. P. 371-389.
Herzberger H.G. Paradoxes of Grounding in Semantics // The Journal of Philosophy. 1970. Vol. 67, № 6. P. 145-167. DOI: 10.2307/2023885.
Armour-Garb B., Woodbridge J.A. Semantic Pathology and the Open Pair // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2005. Vol. 71, № 3. P. 695-703. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00482.x.
Armour-Garb B., Woodbridge J. A. Dialetheism, Semantic Pathology, and the Open Pair // Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 2006. Vol. 84, № 3. P. 395-416. DOI: 10.1080/00048400600895912.
Buridan J. Sophismata // Summulae de Dialectica. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. P. 821-997.
Priest G. Words Without Knowledge // Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2005. Vol. 71, № 3. P. 686-694. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2005.tb00481.x.
Devitt M. The Metaphysics of Deflationary Truth // What is Truth? / ed. R. Schantz. Berlin : Walter de Gruyter Inc, 2002. P. 60-78.
Jago M. What Truth Is. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018. 356 p.
Dummett M. Truth // Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1959. Vol. 59, № 1. P. 141162. DOI: 10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.141.
Soames S. The Truth about Deflationism // Philosophical Issues. 1997. Vol. 8, № 1. P. 1-44. DOI: 10.2307/1522992.
Grover D., Camp J., Belnap N. A Prosentential Theory of Truth // Philosophical Studies. 1975. Vol. 27, № 2. P. 73-125. DOI: 10.1007/BF01209340.
Davidson D. Reality Without Reference // Dialectica. 1977. Vol. 31, № 3-4. P. 247-258. DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1977.tb01287.x
Davidson D. The Structure and Content of Truth // The Journal of Philosophy. 1990. Vol. 87, № 6. P. 279-328. DOI: 10.2307/2026863.
Larson D. Tarski, Davidson, and Theories of Truth // Dialectica. 1988. Vol. 42, № 1. P. 316. DOI: 10.1111/j.1746-8361.1988.tb00900.x.
Kirkham R.L. Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge MA : MIT Press, 1992. 401 p.
Asay J. Primitive Truth // Dialectica. 2013. Vol. 67, № 4. P. 503-519. DOI: 10.1111/17468361.12041.
Asay J. Against Truth // Erkenntnis. 2014. Vol. 79, № 1. P. 147-164. DOI: 10.1007/s10670-013-9483-y.
Boghossian P.A. The Status of Content // The Philosophical Review. 1990. Vol. 99, № 2. P. 157-184. DOI: 10.2307/2185488
Merricks T. Truth and Ontology. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2007. 202 p.
Young J.O. Truth, Correspondence and Deflationism // Frontiers of Philosophy in China. 2009. Vol. 4, № 4. P. 563-575. DOI: 10.1007/s11466-009-0037-y.
Ламберов Л.Д. Дефляционизм, контекстуальность и теория значения // Вестник Томского государственного университета. Философия. Социология. Политология. 2011. № 4(16). С. 31-37.
Salis P. Anaphoric Deflationism, Primitivism, and the Truth Property // Acta Analytica. 2018. [forthcoming] DOI: 10.1007/s12136-018-0363-6.
Salis P. The Generality of Anaphoric Deflationism // Philosophia. 2018. [forthcoming] DOI: 10.1007/s11406-018-9974-9.
Рамсей Ф.П. Факты и пропозиции // Философские работы. М. : Канон+ РООИ Реабилитация, 2011. С. 140-161.
Brandom R. Making It Explicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge MA : Harvard University Press, 1994. 741 p.
Brandom R. Explanatory vs Expressive Deflationism about Truth // What is Truth? / ed. R. Schantz. Berlin : Walter de Gruyter Inc, 2002. P. 103-119.
Lance M. The Significance of Anaphoric Theories of Truth and Reference // Philosophical Issues. 1997. Vol. 8. P. 181-198. DOI: 10.2307/1523004
Brandom R. From Truth to Semantics: A Path through «Making It Explicit» // Philosophical Issues. 1997. Vol. 8. P. 141-154. DOI: 10.2307/1523001.
Lowenstein D. Davidsonian Semantics and Anaphoric Deflationism // Dialectica. 2012. Vol. 66, № 1. P. 23-44. DOI: 10.1111/j. 1746-8361.2012.01288.x.
Grover D. Inheritors and Paradox // The Journal of Philosophy. 1977. Vol. 74, № 10. P. 590604. DOI: 10.2307/2025911.
Lowenstein D. Anaphoric Deflationism and Theories of Meaning // Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference - Meaning and Truth (Amsterdam, October 1-3, 2009) / eds. T. Achourioti, E.J. Andrade, M. Staudacher. Amsterdam : Universiteit van Amsterdam Press, 2010. P. 52-66.
Grover D. «This is False» on the Prosentential Theory // Analysis. 1976. Vol. 36, № 2. P. 80-83. DOI: 10.1093/analys/36.2.80.
Hughes G.E. John Buridan on Self-Reference : Chapter Eight of Buridan's «Sophismata». Cambridge : Cambrige University Press, 1982. 233 p.
Sainsbury R.M. Paradoxes. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2009. 182 p.
Soames S. What is a Theory of Truth? // The Journal of Philosophy. 1984. Vol. 81, № 8. P. 411-429. DOI: 10.2307/2026307.
The truth about "truth" | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2018. № 45. DOI: 10.17223/1998863Х/45/4
Download full-text version
Counter downloads: 3822