Wittgenstein and John Perry on the vision of red: Around the argument of knowledge

Quite often in the philosophy of mind, individual arguments (in support or refutation of physica-lism, functionalism, epiphenomenalism and various versions of dualism) are reproduced outside the historical context and without considering the linguistic turn, as if there was no linguistic turn. While explicating the logical possibility of a zombie, David Chalmers only mentions the book by the Australian philosopher Keith Campbell and the famous article by Robert Kirk (today Kirk continues to work closely on the philosophical zombie) in the commentaries. Usually, the formulation of any argument does not require (within the framework of a conceptual discussion) a return to the historical context. But some ways of thinking after the linguistic turn almost completely disavow the discussion of the logical (or metaphysical) possibility of zombies (and the discussion of an argument directly), and the discussion of other arguments. In this paper, some arguments from the philosophy of mind and the corresponding thought experiments are considered in the context of the philosophy of the late Ludwig Wittgenstein. Attention is paid to the argument of knowledge and the mental experiment “Mary's room” in the presentation of John Perry.

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