Moral objectivity and moral universality: The problem of correlation

Objectivity and universality of moral requirements and moral judgments are the central formal and functional features of morality. Moral objectivity means that moral judgments are not reducible to approval or disapproval of actions by particular individuals or particular cultural groups. Those who use the moral vocabulary for judging actions consider their claims not as mere expressions of their preferences or mere expressions of beliefs commonly held in their communities, but as correct (right) evaluations made on the basis of correct (right) requirements. The phenomenology of moral experience and empirical moral psychology support the thesis that moral requirements and judgments are generally regarded to be objective. Moral philosophy, in its turn, has some compelling reasons to approve this pretension because the recognition of moral objectivity makes it possible to hold strong moral beliefs and to sustain productive discussions on moral matters. Universality of a moral requirement means that it relies upon such a description of a morally significant situation that does not mention any particular individual. A universal requirement establishes a circle of actors obliged to do something, and a circle of recipients who should be treated impartially. The contemporary ethical theory puts forward three approaches to the problem of the correlation between moral objectivity and universality. The first insists on their mutual independence and the possibility of two positions: relativistic objectivism and universalistic subjectivism. The second approach denies the independence of universality, and transforms it into an additional property of some objective requirements and judgments. Thus, relativistic objectivism remains possible, while universalistic subjectivism does not. For supporters of the third approach, objectivity and universality are two inseparable sides of the same feature of morality. The author argues for the third approach. He shows that (a) universalistic subjectivism is possible only if universality proper is substituted by general acceptance and (b) relativistic objectivism is possible only if universality proper is substituted by a high level of generality. Then the author adds one more argument for the third approach: objective requirements should be rationally justified, and we can rationally justify only universal requirements.

Keywords

Authors

References