The fundamental problem of subjectivity in Francisco Valera's neurophenomenology | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2019. № 48. DOI: 10.17223/1998863Х/48/8

The fundamental problem of subjectivity in Francisco Valera's neurophenomenology

Neurophenomenology is one of the programs of cognitive science. The history of the onset of neurophenomenology and its difference in cognitive neurophenomenology (Francisco Varela) and cultural neurophenomenology (Charles Laughlin) are briefly reviewed. The peculiarity of cognitive neurophenomenology is that, within its framework, phenomenology and experimental cognitive science are considered as complementary ways of investigating the nature of consciousness and subjectivity, and their connection with the brain and body. The aim of this article is to analyse the study of the fundamental problem of subjectivity in unity with its biological and physical grounds in Varela's neu-rophenomenological concept. The fundamental problem of subjectivity is presented as a problem of understanding the emergence of living subjectivity in a living being, including the mutual formation of a living being through living subjectivity. The neurophenomenological aspect of the study of consciousness allows representing the relationship of experience and bodily self as a basis for understanding consciousness, and the concept of embodied consciousness as a way of solving the difficult problem of consciousness. The problem of the relationship between the physical system of an individual and their subjective properties is topical for modern cognitive science because, within the framework of functional and neuro-reductionist consciousness, consciousness as a field of subjective experience is eliminated in the process of explanation. In Varela's terms, the connection between the objective and subjective spheres cannot be studied without consciousness. Consciousness is a real object of study for Varela; therefore, the phenomenal properties of consciousness must be taken into account in the explanatory theory. The problem of constituting an autonomous consciousness and revealing the way it exists is connected with biological and cognitive aspects since consciousness can simultaneously be a non-localized virtual point and provide an identity regime that allows for the interaction of consciousness and the world.

Download file
Counter downloads: 297

Keywords

нейрофеноменология, субъективность, воплощенное сознание, трудная проблема сознания, neurophenomenology, subjectivity, embodied consciousness, difficult problem of consciousness

Authors

NameOrganizationE-mail
Shutaleva Anna V.Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsinashutaleva@yandex.ru
Всего: 1

References

Laughlin Ch.D. The prefrontosensorial polarity principle: Toward a neurophenomenological theory of intentionality // Rivista di Biologia / Biology Forum. 1988. 81 (2). P. 243-26O.
Laughlin Ch.D., Rock A.J. Neurophenomenology: Enhancing the Experimental and Cross-Cultural Study of Brain and Experience // Wiley-Blackwell Handbook of Transpersonal Psychology / Ed. H.L. Friedman, G. Hartelius. Wiley, 2O13. P. 261-28O. DOI: 1O.1OO2/9781118591277.ch14
Varela F. Neurophenomenology: A Methodological remedy to the hard problem // Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1996. 3 (4). P. 33O-349.
Husserl E. Cartesian Meditations / Trans. D. Cairns. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988 [1931].
Husserl E. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy -First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology / Trans. F. Kersten. The Hague : Nijhoff, 1982.
Merleau-Ponty M. Phenomenology of Perception / Trans. C. Smith. London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962.
Sartre J.P. Being and Nothingness / Trans. H.E. Barnes. New York : Philosophical Library, 1956.
Varela F., Thompson E., Rosch Е. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience. Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1991.
Varela F. Not one, not two // CoEvolution Quarterly. 1976. 12. P. 62-67.
Varela F. Organism: A meshwork of selfless selves // TAUBER (ed) Organism and the Origin of Self. Dordrecht Kluwer. 1991. P. 79-1O7.
Thompson Е., Varela F.J. Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness // TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences. 2OO1. 5 (1O). P. 418-425.
Nagel T. What Is It Like to Be a Bat? // The Philosophical Review. 1974. 83 (4). P. 435-45O.
Chalmers D.J. Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 1995. 2 (3). P. 2OO-219.
Chiel H., Beer R. The brain has a body: adaptive behavior emerges from interactions of nervous system, body and environment // Trends in neurosciences. 1997. 2O. P. 553-557.
Dunbar R. How many friends does one person need? Dunbar's number and other evolutionary quirks. London : Faber and Faber, 2O1O.
Rizzolatti G., Arbib M. Language within our grasp // Trends in neurosciences. 1998. 21. P. 188-194.
 The fundamental problem of subjectivity in Francisco Valera's neurophenomenology | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2019. № 48. DOI: 10.17223/1998863Х/48/8

The fundamental problem of subjectivity in Francisco Valera's neurophenomenology | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2019. № 48. DOI: 10.17223/1998863Х/48/8

Download full-text version
Counter downloads: 1368