The relevance of philosophical theories of vagueness to legal interpretation | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2019. № 48. DOI: 10.17223/1998863Х/48/21

The relevance of philosophical theories of vagueness to legal interpretation

The paper presents a careful analysis of an application of different philosophical theories of vagueness to legal interpretation. The author argues for the following Irrelevance Thesis: it is irrelevant to legal interpretation which specific philosophical theory of vagueness is to be preferred. In order to establish this thesis, we should distinguish between conceptual clarifications about the nature of vagueness and related phenomena on the one hand and various philosophical theories of vagueness on the other. With regard to many of those clarificatory matters (which the author takes to include specifications about the differences between semantic vagueness and similar phenomena such as ambiguity, generality, and pragmatic vagueness), philosophers widely agree with each other; controversies here mainly arise about how to best define different kinds of vagueness. The situation is different when we consider distinct philosophical accounts on vagueness, such as supervaluationism, contextualism, and degree theories; here, it is a matter of much controversy which theory is to be preferred. The author argues that, while knowledge of what precisely vagueness is bears importance for anyone who works with legal texts, the question of which philosophical theory can best explain vagueness has surprisingly little impact on legal interpretation. For this purpose it is necessary to survey over the most prominent theories of vagueness, to analyse the role that vagueness plays in legal interpretation, and to point out why this role is independent from whatever theory of vagueness is actually correct. The author also discusses recent accounts from Scott Soames and Stephen Schiffer, who both claim to deduce norms for legal interpretation from specific accounts on vagueness. That leads the author to the conclusion: what holds for theories of vagueness holds for theories of meaning as well, namely, they only explain linguistic phenomena, but do not suggest specific ways of using words or interpreting vague expressions.

Download file
Counter downloads: 147

Keywords

vagueness, legal interpretation, sorites paradox, Scott Soames, Stephen Schiffer, неопределенность, толкование права, парадокс «Куча», Скот Сомс, Стивен Шиффер

Authors

NameOrganizationE-mail
Weber Marc AndreeUniversity of Mannheimmarc.andree.weber@phil.uni-mannheim.de
Всего: 1

References

Endicott, T. (2000) Vagueness in Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. (1994) Vagueness. London: Routledge.
Sorensen, R. (1988) Blindspots. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tye, M. (1994) Sorites paradoxes and the semantics of vagueness. In: Tomberlin, J. (ed.) Philosophical Perspectives. 8. pp. 189-206.
Machina, K.F. (1976) Truth, belief, and vagueness. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 5(1). pp. 47-78.
Edgington, D. (1997) Vagueness by degrees. In: Keefe, R. & Smith, P. (eds) Vagueness: A Reader. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. pp. 294-316.
Fine, K. (1975) Vagueness, truth and logic. Synthese. 30(3-4). pp. 265-300.
Raffman, D. (1994) Vagueness without paradox. The Philosophical Review. 103(1). pp. 4174.
Weber, M.A. (2016) The non-conservativeness of legal definitions. In: Keil, G. & Poscher, R. (eds) Vagueness and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 189-203.
Alston, W.P. (1967) Vagueness. In: Edwards, P. (ed.) The Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York: Macmillan. pp. 218-221.
Poscher, R. (2011) Ambiguity and vagueness in legal interpretation. In: Solan, L. & Tiersma, P. (eds) Oxford Handbook on Language and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 128-144.
Kolber, A.J. (2014) Smooth and bumpy laws. California Law Review. 102(3). pp. 655-690.
Kolber, A.J. (2016) Smoothing vague laws. In: Keil, G. & Poscher, R. (eds) Vagueness and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 275-295.
Soames, S. (2012) Vagueness and the law. In: Marmor, A. (ed.) The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law. New York: Routledge. pp. 113-126.
Asgeirsson, H. (2016) Can legal practice adjudicate between theories of vagueness? Keil, G. & Poscher, R. (eds) Vagueness and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 95-125.
Schiffer, S. (2001) A little help from your friends? Legal Theory. 7(4). pp. 421-432.
Schiffer, S. (2016) Philosophical and jurisprudential issues of vagueness. In: Keil, G. & Po-scher, R. (eds) Vagueness and Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 23-48.
Greenawalt, K. (2001) Vagueness and judicial responses to legal indeterminacy. Legal Theory. 7(4). pp. 433-445. DOI: 10.1017/S1352325201704077
Scalia, A. (1997) A Matter of Interpretation. Federal Courts and the Law. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Garner, B. & Scalia, A. (2012) Reading Law. The Interpretation of Legal Texts. St. Paul (MN): Thomson/West
 The relevance of philosophical theories of vagueness to legal interpretation | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2019. № 48. DOI: 10.17223/1998863Х/48/21

The relevance of philosophical theories of vagueness to legal interpretation | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2019. № 48. DOI: 10.17223/1998863Х/48/21

Download full-text version
Counter downloads: 1368