Evidence, Thinking, Rule-Following

The starting point of the study is the question of the origin of evidence in cognition. On the example of the concept of pure logic by Edmund Husserl, the role of evidence in the foundation of logico-theoretical knowledge is considered. The advantages of this concept are demonstrated in opposition to the relativistic interpretation of cognition. The principle of the analytic truth of identity sentences with a problematization of the distinction between pure rationality and real conditions of rule implementation is criticized. The connection between language and thinking in the context of the relativistic argument of the “late” Ludwig Wittgenstein is discussed. The results of the research show that the universalistic interpretation of cognition in Husserl's sense resolves the problem of relativism, but does not answer the question about its own foundations. The assumption of a necessary correlation between the logico-theoretical and logico-psychological content of thinking in cognition turns out to be fictitious. When applied to its own principles, the apriorism of Husserl's type demonstrates formal limitations and epistemological incompleteness. This is confirmed by an attempt to explicate the epistemological foundations of logico-theoretical principles within a formal self-definition. Then the question of the existence of universal principles in cognition is reduced to the rule-following problem. The interpretation of Wittgenstein's skeptical argument points to the irreducibility of logicG-theoretical knowledge to universal principles of thinking. From this, a conclusion is made about the incoherence of universalistic views.

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