An Extension of Argumentation Structures with an Objectification of Discussions
The author shows that, when formalizing discussions that take place in modern philosophical journals, it is necessary to take into account the fact that a new discussion participant can use the preceding discussion as a whole in order to support his/her own claim. This means that the constructed formalization must operate with objects that are entire discussions, which contain statements related by relations of support and attack. The author gives some examples of discussions that are attacked as a whole or supported (some claims) as a whole. He shows that, in order for those discussions to fulfill this role, they must be substantiated or objectified, i.e. our logical means should allow us to represent discussions as a single object, distinct from other objects. The author show that, for example, both B. Verheij's Theory of Dialectical Argumentation DefLog and E.N. Lisanyuk's Logical-Cognitive Argumentation Theory do not enable to objectify some common types of discussions, and therefore these theories are to be extended. To wit, the author shows that these theories are not capable of describing the following three situations in their languages. (1) Two agents support their claims, each of them gives an argument in support of his/her claim, and each of those supports is also an attack on the opponent's claim. After that, a third agent treats the situation entirely as a dead end and uses it as a support for his/her own thesis. (2) The first agent, based on his/her initial premises, has to admit the first statement to be supported, then, based on it and on the initial premises, s/he has to admit the second statement to be supported, etc. ad infinitum. The second agent attacks the entire infinite regress generated in this way, i.e. s/he attacks the entire sequence of statements related by the relation of support. In the attacking statement, the second agent asserts that the sequence of supports cannot go to infinity. (3) The first agent puts forward two positions supporting each other. The second agent attacks the entire "circular" supporting indicating that it is unacceptable for something to be supported by itself.
Keywords
теория аргументации,
структура аргументации,
DefLog,
логика аргументации,
отменяемая аргументация,
argumentation theory,
argumentation structure,
DefLog,
logic of argumentation,
defeasible logicAuthors
| Berestov Igor V. | Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences | berestoviv@yandex.ru |
Всего: 1
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