The Ontological Status of Ascriptive Expressions in Ordinary Language

The criticism of "axioms of reference" leads us to a revision of existent views on the character of language functioning and ways of its connection with the reality. One of the ways to connect language and reality is reference, which modern analytic philosophy pays great attention to. At the same time, other aspects of language, the phenomenon of ascriptivism for instance, lack attention. In everyday language, there are expressions which are descriptive in the form but they do not describe any objects. Nevertheless, first, they are not counterintuitive, and, second, their usage leads to different extralin-guistic consequences. The specificity of such expressions is being distinguished, and their connection with ontology is being identified. The example of a linguistic expression "the crime that Bill committed" demonstrates that some descriptive expressions are not really descriptions. The use of the expression "the crime that Bill committed" in two possible worlds is different only because crime is defined in different ways in each of the worlds. In case of the first possible world w-1 it is reasonable, whereas in case of the world w-2 it is not. In spite of the fact that a particular situation has happende in both of the possible worlds, in the possible world w-2 there was no occasion which can be indicated by the phrase "the crime that Bill committed". It is concluded that some descriptive expressions do not tend to describe a certain object, but ascribe a certain status to an object. Herbert Hart elaborates the idea of ascription. Ascriptivism by Hart is a characteristic of the language of law. In the article, ascriptivism of everyday language is demonstrated. Thus, for example, the analyzed expression "the crime that Bill committed" can be both the phrase of the language of law and of everyday language depending on the context of its usage. Hart's conception gives an impression that only expressions of the language of law have such qualities as ascriptivism and cancellation. On the example of goal scoring in football, ascriptivism and cancellation in everyday language are demonstrated. Ascriptivism of language represents another, different to the reference, way to connect language and reality. While descriptions point at a certain object, that is refer to it, ascriptive expressions construct ontology ascribing a certain status to an object thus introducing a new object. Such objects as crime, goal and offside do not exist outside the practice of language. For example, having a good reason, circumstances when during the game the ball crosses the line of the gate can be qualified as a goal. However, in the situation of a foul, circumstances when the ball crosses the line of the gate will not be qualified as a goal.

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