Conditions of "General Significance" of Knowledge in Formal Pragmatics

The article discusses an aspect of Habermas's teaching related to the theory of formal pragmatics he developed and his views on the basis of knowledge. The remarkableness of formal pragmatics is due to the fact that this concept, on the one hand, is the embodiment of the so-called post-metaphysical thinking, which is characterized by the rejection of thought "under the sign of eternity" and the recognition of the essential situationality of our thinking, and, on the other hand, it retains the role of the "guardian of rationality" for philosophy and sees its task in finding the grounds that make "claims on rationality", going beyond local sociocultural contexts. The author is interested in the question of whether it is possible to consider Habermas's views on the essence of cognitive activity as a continuation of universalism in the theory of knowledge. Or is it, despite the discussion of the conditions of the general significance of knowledge, the continuation of the substantiation of the position of contextual-lism and relativism in the epistemology characteristic of post-metaphysical thought? In response to the questions posed, the author, firstly, considers the theory of the "life world" Habermas proposed and, secondly, the concept of "communicative rationality" he introduced. The author notes that formal pragmatics is not a concept that continues the tradition of universalism in the theory of knowledge, it affirms the principles of contextualism and relativism in epistemology. Habermas proceeds from the fact that our cognitive activity is carried out in the horizon of a specific life world, it always grows out of the local historical context, due to cultural traditions and social habits, which means that our knowledge of the world is not value-neutral. In addition, the so-called "universal significant claims" of the language are not absolute intelligible structures that are "beyond space and time", they are inscribed in history and culture. Claims for significance do not ensure the universality and necessity of the results of cognition in Kant's sense. General significance is associated only with the achievement of involuntary consent within a community. In addition, the universalist potential of communication is realized only within the life world of modern society. For the living world of traditional societies, rational communication in Habermas's sense is not characteristic.

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