What Else Is Wrong With the "Private Language Argument"?

The article is devoted to the private language problem formulated by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his book Philosophical Investigations. The problem is considered through the prism of analysis of Saul Kripke's interpretation of the private language argument presented in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. The purpose of the analysis is to clarify the meaning of the notion of "understanding the language". For this purpose, the author of the article distinguishes two types of the theory of meaning. Such a distinction allows achieving the three main objectives of the research. (1) This distinction reveals the fundamental duality of the notion "understanding". Thus, in terms of the theory of meaning of the first type, "understanding" is identified with interpretation (in the sense of establishing correspondence between non-linguistic entities and linguistic units). While, in terms of the theory of meaning of the second type, "understanding" is identified with understanding of the rule (in the sense of being master of a technique of following the rules of correct usage). (2) This distinction also clarifies how Wittgenstein and his interpreters treat the duality of the notion "understanding". It is shown that this duality is of great methodological significance for Wittgenstein, who uses it as an important tool for distinguishing between two interdependent aspects of language understanding. In turn, Kripke neglects the methodological significance of this duality and uses the notion "understanding" in one single meaning as understanding of the rule. (3) Finally, this distinction allows explicating the conceptual inconsistency between the description of the private language (given in § 243 of Philosophical Investigations) and Kripke's interpretation of the private language argument. The second part of the article is devoted to the justification of the assumption that the above-mentioned conceptual inconsistency is critical to Kripke's argument. The article concludes that the explication of the conceptual inconsistency between the description of the private language and Kripke's interpretation of the private language argument not only clarifies the discussion of the private language problem, but also opens the way for the possibility of a private language.

Keywords

Authors

References