Oppositions of Philosophical Programs in Solving Problems of Neuroethics
The aim of the article is to establish a relation between philosophical programs and solutions to problems that are discussed in neuroethics. This kind of relation illustrates neuroscience as a techno-science characterized by a strong connection between fundamental and applied levels. Neuroethics is considered as the space for the actualization of philosophical programs in the philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of law. The impulse from modern neuroscience makes us revise the conceptual baggage of philosophical programs, to fill it with new content. The confrontation of traditional philosophical approaches to the problem of human mind and the whole sphere of the ideal enters a completely different stage, in the context of new data of brain activity. New aspects are opening up in the discussion of compatibilists and incompatibilists about free will. For instance, arguments from philosophical discussions are relevant for neuroethics in discussing the problem of preserving personal identity, using various stimulations of brain activity. Another example is the dispute over responsibility for the acts committed. Representatives of hard incompatibility (Derek Pereboom) believe that modern neuroscience research has debunked the beliefs in the existence of free will; therefore, the concept of responsibility should be revised. The opposition of legal positivism and natural law acquires a new meaning in the philosophy of law, which is important for neuroethics since the distinction between rights and law will determine its regulatory capabilities. Neuroethics may be understood not just as a kind of bioethics with its neurotechnology dilemmas. The status of neuroethics is discussed when it refers to neuroscience ethics, which explains moral phenomena for neurophysio-logical reasons. Discussions between naturalistic and sociocultural explanations of morality again return to philosophy. Thus, the opposition to philosophical programs creates an important potential for understanding neuroethics itself. The programs do not just compete, but, thanks to the perception of ideas from neuroscience, they qualitatively complicate and open up new possibilities for discussing the problems of neuroethics.
Keywords
нейроэтика,
свобода воли,
натурализм в этике,
философия права,
автономия личности,
моральная ответственность,
neuroetics,
freewill,
naturalism in ethics,
philosophy of lawAuthors
| Sidorova Tatyana A. | Novosibirsk State University | t.sidorova@g.nsu.ru |
| Sandakova L.B. | Novosibirsk State Technical University | l.sandakova@mail.ru |
Всего: 2
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