The Second Period of Richard Bernstein’s Work as Critical Neopragmatism

Modern American philosophy is unthinkable without pragmatic tendencies, and it is definitely determined by them. The new period of the flourishing of pragmatism in the second half of the 20th century associated with the name of Richard Rorty, who managed to find a solution on how to combine continental and analytic traditions of philosophy, which led to the revival of pragmatism. Richard Bernstein belongs to contemporary neopragmatism, whose representatives are Rorty’s direct successors. The assessment of Bernstein’s “new” neopragmatism allows understanding the mechanism of the evolution and development of conceptual schemas of two contradictory analytic and continental discourses. According to Bernstein, it makes no sense to diverse analytic or continental traditions in philosophy and also to speak separately about pragmatism, since all three philosophical directions deal with general pragmatist themes that characterize the “pragmatist turn”. Bernstein devoted the initial period of his philosophical career to the study of classical pragmatism. In the second period of his work, Bernstein actualizes the issues of understanding the role and place of pragmatism in philosophy, which will have a significant impact on the subsequent development of the whole direction. During this period, Bernstein addresses the key concepts of pragmatist doctrines and discussions - objectivism and relativism, considered in terms of understanding rationality in matters of truth, rational practices and ethical preferences. In all the works of this period, Bernstein uses a critical approach, borrowed from the continental critical theory. Bernstein defines rationality through communication, which is fully consistent with both pragmatist attitudes and the principles of the rhetorical turn. He concludes that even with some “standards of rationality”, they are not universal and can change over time or in accordance with the requirements imposed by historical periods or cultures. Bernstein believes that a proper understanding of relativism occurs not only in opposition to objectivism, but also in distinguishing it from subjectivism. Bernstein shows that the concepts of relativism and objectivism are meaningful only from within the Cartesian tradition of modernism, and if the so-called Cartesian anxiety as a kind of fear of relativism is eliminated, it is possible to bring the entire philosophical discourse beyond the limits of objectivism and relativism. It is concluded that Bernstein’s views in the second period of his work and the main markers of neopragmatism (anti-foundationalism, pluralism and communicate community) are formed in a critical discussion with the ideas of leading philosophers of science, with continental philosophy, and finally with Rorty. On this basis, this period of his work is qualified as critical neopragmatism.

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