Selfward Speech Acts in the Context of Kant's Ethics and More

The author assumes that, alongside with a variety of speech acts that are addressed to the other, there are speech acts that are addressed to the speaker himself. These are selfward commands, promises, declaratives, and others. The aim of this article is to show that types of selfward speech acts can be distinguished between each other, and that these differences are fundamental within some areas of philosophical knowledge (ethics, for example). On the basis of Kant's goodwill ethical doctrine, the author shows that the distinction between selfward commissive/directive (roughly, selfward promise / command) and selfward declarative (roughly, selfward manifestation/proclamation) is fundamental. The major result is obtained due to the usage of formal philosophy of action tools, namely, a variation of the propositional dynamic logic. Using these tools, the author manages to demonstrate that free will defines itself with respect to the law of moral action as a deliberative agent (which reflects in formalism with the help of dstit-operator), while the act of free will of defining itself to a certain action is not deliberative (which reflects in formalism with the help of cstit-operator). The analysis of the way these two corresponding formulas show themselves on frames reveals the fundamental distinction between free will modes of action. Selfward declarative is the form of a universal code that is used by free will to make it respect the law of moral action. Selfward commissive/directive is the form of private practical principles (maxims), a form of making free will perform a certain act.

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