Historical Responsibility: Beyond Free Will and Determinism

The article successively discusses three objectives: conditions of the origin and direction of transformation of the idea of responsibility; analysis of the results achieved along the way; and their application to research the idea of historical responsibility. Based on the analysis of the works of McKeon, Jonas, Vogelmann, and Williams, it is shown that the origin and direction of changes in the idea of responsibility are linked with the specificity of modern civilization: democratization of public life; future-oriented attitudes, growth of technological potential; and variety of systems of normative demands. It is noted that this state of affairs requires the formation of a subject capable of reflectivity, judgment, imagination, and initiative; involves the development of the ability to coordinate different normative demands in time and space, and is aimed at universalizing these requirements and skills. As a result, responsibility begins to be interpreted not so much as responsibility for the harm caused (outcome responsibility), but as responsibility for the future; take not only a legal but also a moral character; turn not only into a list of requirements, but also into value (virtue responsibility); be interpreted not only as a set of reproaches and accusations, but also as the ability to adequately respond to the growing diversity and inconsistency of normative attitudes. It is shown that in modern literature, starting with Hart's works, responsibility is interpreted not as a single, unitary, and generic concept, but as a set of meanings. In general, we can speak at least about the following meanings of this concept: capacity responsibility; virtue responsibility; causal responsibility; outcome responsibility; forward-looking responsibility or role responsibility. The perspective of the contextual approach to the interpretation of the content of responsibility is shown. It presupposes the rejection of its naturalistic interpretations and the connection with the peculiarities of the dominant norms and values. Smiley's ideas were taken as methodological guidelines that concretize the contextualist approach. Smiley insists on the dependence of our interpretations of responsibility on both our configuration of the individual's social role and our own sense of whether or not those being harmed are part of the individual's community. To identify the specifics of moral responsibility, Kant's ideas about the role of dignity as a determining moral principle and respect as a priority moral motive were used. The preference of the Kantian approach in comparison with the Strawsonian idea of reactive attitudes is shown. The above approaches were applied to the interpretation of historical responsibility. It is proposed to interpret historical responsibility as responsibility for preserving knowledge (memory) of the past. Within the framework of this approach, it is proposed to single out three roles in the distribution of areas of responsibility: producers of historical knowledge, translators, and consumers (readers). It is shown that the formation of knowledge (memory) about the past involves not only a revision of the content of stories (the formation of shared history and dialogical memory), but also the rejection of ethnocentrism or methodological nationalism as the principles of interpreting the past. It is emphasized that the use of Kantian interpretations of dignity and respect determines the criterion for a moral attitude to the past and allows one to create an appropriate framework for the interpretation of certain segments of the past.

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