The Theory of Truth in Friedrich Nietzsche's Philosophy

The article considers the theory of truth in the concept of philosophy of language proposed by Friedrich Nietzsche. A large number of researchers significant for the analytic tradition (Arthur Danto, Richard Rorty, etc.) draw a parallel between Nietzsche's philosophy and the positions of American pragmatists (especially William James and John Dewey). Pragmatism does not consider truth in a correspondent sense, but as a set of definitions that can be considered useful for everyday life. Such a connection between truth and utility can indeed be found in Nietzsche's works, but the concept of truth is embedded in the language theory he develops. From Nietzsche's point of view, it is not individual statements that are useful, but the language itself as it forms the external and internal reality of the individual. Such an interpretation of language allows looking differently at the problems of realism and anti-realism related to the names of Hilary Putnam and Richard Rorty, and, although Rorty tries to point to his connection with Nietzsche's ideas, there are a number of fundamental differences between their positions. One such difference is the interpretation of metaphors (Donald Davidson); although there are certain similarities between Nietzsche's and Davidson's views, this understanding of language does not allow considering these theories relevant to each other. If in Davidson's analysis metaphors do not express anything new about facts/objects, in Nietzsche's philosophy objects themselves (as well as subjects opposed to them) are considered as metaphors, i.e. linguistically loaded constructs. Therefore, metaphors should be considered as a way of changing our language games. Since this will directly disrupt an individual's communication with society, such a process cannot be considered as pragmatically oriented. This leads to a key difference between Nietzschean and pragmatic positions: the usefulness of our false conceptions allows us to call them truths, but Nietzsche denies that such "truths" have a certain metaphysical basis. Truth should be regarded exclusively as a "metaphor" that allows other metaphors of our reality (subject, object, cognition, etc.) to work. The supporters of the deflationary theory of truth interpret the concept of truth in a similar way.

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