Computationalism, Information and Consciousness: On the Way to Solving a "Hard Problem"

Ince the middle of the past century, the terms "computation" and "information processing" have been central to many cognitive theories, research on computer modeling of intellectual functions, and the analytic philosophy of mind. The human mind has become more and more like a computer that receives information from the environment and uses it for management purposes, and basic mental abilities such as reasoning, decision-making, etc. like computations performed by an abstract Turing machine. The computational approach was developed by such philosophers as Hilary Putnam, Jerry Fodor, and Fred Dretske; today it plays a significant role in the works of Gualtiero Piccinini, Daniel Dennett, David Chalmers, and others. However, there is still no consensus on what physical states are the basis of computational processes, whether these processes are sufficient for the emergence of thinking, and whether it is possible to describe the nature of phenomenal conscious experiences in computational terms; accordingly, some researchers criticize this approach. The main arguments against computationalism include the triviality argument, the Goedel incompleteness argument, the Chinese room argument, and others. As a functionalist theory, computationalism is also threatened by the so-called "ontological gap" in explanation, which stands in the way of solving the "hard problem" of consciousness formulated by Chalmers. To avoid this, the Australian philosopher introduced the double aspect principle of information, according to which information in the world is represented both physically, that is, objectively and independently of the observer, and phenomenally. Of course, even when combined with the two-dimensional principle of information, computationalism will not solve all its inherent conceptual difficulties. It is likely that the answers to the above questions will soon be found in the natural sciences, among which computational ideas remain very popular.

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