Description and Explanation in the Social Sciences in the Framework of Arthur Danto's Analytical Philosophy

The article explores the problem of the relationship between quantitative and qualitative methods in sociology. Since the quantitative approach claims to identify the structure of sociological reality and the qualitative one to identify causal relationships, it is proposed to consider this problem in the context of the relationship between description and explanation. Following Herbert Blumer, I believe that the gap between these methods arises due to the uncertainty of sociological concepts, but, at the same time, I critically consider the solution he proposes. The latter consists in the sensitization of concepts, which implies that the concept should not be considered from the point of view of theoretical criteria, but as explaining some practice. In my opinion, this leads to difficulties in disseminating concepts within the scientific community, and also does not allow them to be corrected in order to bring them into accordance with practice. Instead, it is proposed to use the analytical approach of Arthur Danto, which he uses to describe the philosophy of history, but with minor changes it could be applied in sociology. At the first stage it is necessary to formulate a description of a sociological phenomenon that allows a nomological explanation in the framework of Carl Hempel's scheme. Danto's central idea here is that any phenomenon can be given such a description (although it may be hard to find). Further, using formalized concepts, which are logical constructions from individual attitudes, an explanation of this phenomenon is compiled by including it in a line of other phenomena already described. As a result, conceptual analysis plays a dual role in the social sciences. On the one hand, it helps to formulate correct descriptions of phenomena, and, on the other hand, it acts as a tool for explaining them.

Keywords

Authors

References