The Transcendental Intermediary in Analytic Philosophy

The transcendental intermediary aspect is a core link in analytic philosophers' papers, which enables verifying the ontological metaphysical tendency development in the course of the Kantian epistemological tradition. Up to this moment, the way of the Kantian tradition development in analytic philosophy is undefined. It rejects critical idealism as a term, whereas the transcendental intermediary is accepted to have different meanings. There is a hypothesis concerning multiple tendencies in the Kantian tradition development, perceiving ontological and epistemological items to be separate. The transcendental intermediary rejects a direct cognition of reality. It represents either a phenomenon or a concept. Quine's ontological relativity presents language as the transcendental intermediary, which exerts a link between epistemological and ontological Kantian traditions. In Quine's essays, language ontology, perceived as the transcendental intermediary, is not unique. It is also accepted to be a separate tendency in Kant's tradition, representing methodology and excluding epistemology, in the course of logic and semantics. Peter Strawson's Individuals is not a separate epistemological theory. Its first part is derived from Kantian metaphysics, but the second tends to be a specific research in logic and semantics. Language ontology in Individuals covers several levels. As a whole theory, it comprises metaphysical aspects, those of reality and language grammatical categories representing a new language ontology. Similar to Quine's papers, it mostly covers the logical and semantic essence of language units, as well as the communicative function, which naturally denies epistemological influence. Epistemological and ontological unity as the result of blending is not realized. Neither Quine's categories nor Strawson's universals or particulars represent an epistemological conception. The basic core trend caused by Kant's influence in language philosophy is logical and semantic language ontology, the principle of reference and the relevant categories. The theory of reference is equal to the semantic one, though there is no transcendental semantics affirmed as the philosophical sphere: see Kant's influence upon Austin's theory, which has nothing to do with transcendental epistemology. The transcendental theory in language ontology does not have a wide influence upon analytic philosophy. This matter has been accepted by the sovereign transcendental intermediary, performing the scheme of concepts for analytic philosophers' papers, but it does not influence the mere ontological system. “Transcendentalism” as a term has an uncertain meaning: it specifies Kantian philosophy, represents a complex ontology for objects, synonymous to idealism. There is no precise model of the transcendental epistemological theory equal to Quine's papers. Transcendental ontological autonomy is confirmed by Kantian influence upon the origins of semantics, the category of meaning, the complex language ontology, its referential intentions and equal links between language units, which does nott uncover epistemological origins.

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