Science: A Public Good and a Humanistic Project

The consistency of science with the values of humanism and the humanistic contribution of science to social development are two sides of the problematization of science as a public good. To what extent is science in its specificity a boon to the rest of society? And what is this benefit: intellectual, utilitarian or moral? To what extent does society - the state, private capital or individuals - have the rights to science as its property? What is the person that makes science and enjoys its gifts? While answering these questions, it is necessary to distinguish between two meanings of science as a public good in Russian- and English-language literature. The expression Nauka kak obshchestvennoe blago [Science as a public good] in Russian is not identical with the English “Science as a public good”: literal translation does not work. The reason for this disagreement between Russian and English is the difference in attitude to science. In Russian philosophy, the problem is traditionally put in terms of ideological and utilitarian functions of science, while in the phrase (which is not too common) “science as a public good” the emphasis is put on “good”. One speaks about the advantages that science provides to society: the scientific outlook and economic well-being. The value of basic and applied science to society is accepted as something self-evident albeit different. On the one hand, science acts as something speculative, optional for life and detached from it: it is about the ideal value of science as a subject matter of moral discourse. This is dictated by the transcendental-publicistic tradition of Russian philosophy, which was not overcome by Marxist naturalism and pragmaticism because of their inconsistency, incompatibility with the practice of “real socialism”. Sergei Bulgakov clearly expressed the sofiynost' [Sophianic nature] of science and at the same time its limitations in his Philosophy of Economy (2009). On the other hand, Russian Marxism was close to the utilitarian interpretation of the slogan “Knowledge Is Power”, including Marx's idea of science as a productive force. In the case of the Western tradition, the focus in this phrase shifts to “public” meaning that fundamental science, unlike applied and educational sciences, cannot be the subject of private interest, because it does not bring profit, and the private interest is treated exclusively in the liberal-economic way. Therefore, no one seeks to privatize and develop science, except those states that commit themselves to financing public funds of consumption and view science as an intellectual value. In some cases, it is residual funding (Russia), in others it is a priority (South Korea). It is in this sense that basic science appears as a “social commodity” that no one buys but receives from the state for free. Therefore, social status is usually relatively low and similar to social welfare - as opposed to wages. Applied science, conversely, is interpreted within the framework of the empirical-pragmatic analytical tradition as the embodiment of experienced and useful knowledge, which promotes the production of goods and is itself the subject of commodity exchange. In this case, science is referred to as a consumer goods object, a commodity, a useful object. This is the position of classical political economy. Adam Smith wrote that much of knowledge is borrowed from other people and from other sources and is acquired in the same way as shoes are bought. This opposition is key to the social existence of modern science as knowledge and social institution. Its resolution requires further clarification of the status of science as a cognitive, political and moral value.

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