Criticism of the Theory of Types in the Early Wittgenstein's Philosophy

The article is devoted to considerations of early Wittenstein's views on the problem of logical paradoxes. The most well-known way of solving logical paradoxes is the hierarchical approach. First, Russell developed the theory of types in which paradoxes were solved at the level of revealing correct forms of thinking, and then Tarski formulated the semantic conception of metalanguages, in which paradoxes were solved at the level of revealing correct forms of representation of thinking in language. The main methodological step used in this hierarchical approach to solving the problem of paradoxes is prohibiting the phenomenon of self-reference. Russell's theory of types regards as logically incorrect such concepts and methods of reasoning the formation of which relies on the phenomenon of selfreference. Tarski's conception of metalanguages forbids mixing the object language and the metalanguage, which itself becomes the object language for the next-level metalanguage. Selfreference in language is possible only when the object language and the metalanguage are mixed, and, in Tarski's conception, this situation is considered semantically incorrect. Although the hierarchical approach is still considered the most orthodox way of solving logical paradoxes, it is increasingly criticized in the research literature on logic, epistemology, and the philosophy of mathematics in the last decades of the 20th century and in the early 21st century in which various shortcomings of Russell's and Tarski's positions are pointed out. The author of this article draws attention to the special position of Wittgenstein in the context of discussion on the problem of logical paradoxes he expressed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and other writings of the early period of his philosophy. The author asserts that Wittgenstein's position proves to be invulnerable to modern critics of the hierarchical approach.

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