Wittgenstein's Theory of Symbolism and the Autonomy of Formal Knowledge

The article is a response to a work by Vsevolod Ladov, which is devoted to the discussion of the views of the “early” Wittgenstein on the problem of logical paradoxes. It follows from Ladov's work that Wittgenstein's position, preceding the TLP period, is the most radical version of the hierarchical approach, which has a more significant argumentation potential than Russell's theory of logical types. According to Ladov, taking into account the spatial-graphic syntax model proposed by Wittgenstein, problems associated with self-referential identities should be resolved without any additional theoretical study. In contrast to the criticism of the theory of types, criticism of the theory of types in the works of the “early” Wittgenstein is of a different nature. It focuses not on the denial of the theory of types itself, but on the fact that its postulation turns out to be simply redundant for the logical-theoretical analysis. This article provides a number of arguments against the thesis Ladov defends. It is shown that the foundations of Wittgenstein's theory of symbolism do not correlate with the operation of the principles it establishes: none of the possible interpretations of this theory can avoid the need for hierarchical typology.

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