The Logic of Action as a Tool for Analyzing and Solving Philosophical Problems
The article investigates the question about the possibility of treating contemporary logic with its methods of analysis and its discipline-specific subjects as a tool that can be used efficiently and comfortably by specialists in philosophy. From this point of view, I firstly investigate the methods of the logic of action - one of the branch of contemporary logic - and then demonstrate how the arsenal of the logic of action can be applied in the field of philosophy today. Firstly, I demonstrate the richness of the logic of action methods by expressing with the means of classical semantics of the notion of the agentive degree or the degree of agency. Secondly, by using the set-theoretical approach, I point out the new way of development for the logic of action that lies in the traditional area of philosophical knowledge. Here I argue that it is possible to regard as a new subject for the logic of action the selfward actions and the structures of so-called agentive domains, or the sets of state of affairs that can be put into existence via agentive actions. In the conclusion, I claim that the logic of action, or, following my proposal, the logic of choice with its methods will be well adopted into the set of investigation practices of those who are professionals in the realm of philosophy.
Keywords
logic of action,
philosophical question,
agent,
logical semantics,
refrainingAuthors
Karpov Gleb V. | Saint Petersburg State University | glebsight@gmail.com |
Всего: 1
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