Rediscovering Instrumentalism: The Philosophy of Technology in the Works of the Classics of American Pragmatism

The philosophy of technology traditionally considers the efficiency of technological knowledge as the main criterion of truth, i.e. the ability to reach the best-planned result having spent the minimum of resources. Despite the fact that this criterion is, no doubt, pragmatic, studies on technology proper by representatives of pragmatism are little known not only to Russian philosophers but also to foreign thinkers. Works by classics of American pragmatism in this field were practically unknown even in the United States until the late 20th century [Olsen, Pedersen, Hendricks, 2009]. One of the major ideas of pragmatism is a broad interpretation of technological knowledge, which is not limited to the knowledge of production and use of artifacts but applies to all spheres of human activity where a result is required. Within pragmatism, knowledge itself is seen as a tool: according to William James, theories become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest [James, 1975]. John Dewey pushes this idea still further by treating logical objects, numbers, hypotheses and other abstract entities as tools that are designed, developed and utilized in much the same ways as material tools, that is, for the sake of achieving some desired end [Dewey, 1984]. The distinctive feature of Dewey’s approach is that he does not associate technological knowledge exclusively with the creation of material objects, but finds its manifestations in science, education, philosophy, art, and even religion. In his interpretation, the difference between material tools and abstract objects is exclusively functional since they serve to reach different goals. However, numbers, just like religious and artistic ideas, ceremonial tools are essentially equivalent to technical objects. His technological knowledge serves as a universal type of knowledge, making it possible to reach the desired results in production and in the application of mechanisms, as well as in training, artistic endeavor, scientific cognition, and other types of spiritual activity. In this sense, Dewey’s works of the late 19th century were contrary to the understanding of technology and technological knowledge widespread at that time, as well as to philosophical concepts of the 20th century, associating the technological exclusively with material culture. As L. Hickman notes, Dewey’s studies in the philosophy of technology were practically unknown largely due to this even at home until the late 20th century [Hickman, 2009: 175]. For Dewey, the success of technological sciences is associated with the fact that, within technological cognition, the theoretical (basic) and practical (applied) forms of cognitive activity are seen as equivalent tools, allowing the production of new devices and methods of activity. His technology serves as logos techne, making it possible to study the technological in the same way as biology studies life. The pragmatic aspect of technology is associated with the fact that it represents all rational methods that help channel and utilize the energy of nature and humans to meet human needs. In fact, he considers technological activity as the use of some natural objects to transform other objects to meet human needs. Answering human inquiries, technology always remains dependent on human goals. To this end, Dewey’s conception is contrary to the ideas of the philosophers of technology of the Frankfurt School who called attention to technology-induced alienation and ideological enforcement [Horkheimer, 1947]. Giving equal rights to technological and cognitive tools, Dewey defined his position as instrumentalism, providing grounds for criticism. Opponents accused him of placing tools or means of achieving goals above the goals themselves. At present, as the development of information technologies makes the relevance of the instrumental component of cognitive activity being actively studied, resorting to classical pragmatism may help form present-day ideas of knowledge and its production.

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