Towards a Metaphysical Research Program of Evolutionary Processes in Sci ence: Thomas Kuhn and Imre Lakatos

A characteristic feature of the philosophy of science of the mid-twentieth century was a departure from the purely logical analysis of scientific knowledge and appeal to outer aspects of its functioning and development. A vivid expression of this turning point was the frequently repeated Lakatos's paraphrase of the Kantian dictum: “Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind”. The epistemological trend declared by Lakatos and presented in his works triggered a number of debates and discussions. Kuhn's position is especially representative in this respect because, due to his approach, the possibility of two versions of the historiography of science was clearly revealed. The first one, largely exclusive, is announced by Lakatos. Its essence lies in the developing of a logical mechanism which determines the character of changes of the processes of scientific knowledge. Appeal to the real history of science within this approach is set only by the needs of the verification of the “work” of the specified mechanism. The traditional (even for historiography) view on the ways of forming knowledge about history of science is presented by Kuhn. The events in the history of science need to be presented accordingly to the principle of how it was in reality. The form of such historiography is narrative. In general, Kuhn's epistemological model of science transffers the analysis of cognitive activities into the terms of communication inside the scientific community in synchrony as well as in diachrony. The article shows the consequences that can result from such an approach. Notably, the concept of scientific revolutions is becoming absolutely unjustified.

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