Ethos of Science and Logic of Its Description by Means of Analytic Philosophy

In the light of Wittgenstein's analytic studies, discussion of the theory of the ethos of science by Merton allows achieving the goal of clarifying the grounds for argumentation of statements about the ideals of scientists' behavior and communication. The author complements Richardson's comparison of developments in the sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of science. As a basic methodology, the approach gives grounds for revealing possibilities of sociological knowledge in regard to the description of the ethos of science and its components, such as universalism, “communism” (or “communitarianism” as an orientation for the common goods), disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. In general, it is possible to clarify the generalized ethos of science as a topic of study. This clarification involves the intersection of scientific divisions with the points of the inevitable departure of norms of behavior in scientific community beyond the scope of a purely scientific description. It becomes possible to regulate the cognitive process, which is based on criticism of existing types of scientific behavior and communication. Cognitive process reveals the foundations of social relations at mutual suppression of scientific and extra-scientific types of rationality. As a result, the research shows the ideals that a scientist should follow in order to be a successful researcher and to keep the possibility of harmonizing his/her own behavior and the expectations of the world around. In an epistemological perspective, analysis of the boundaries of the normative definition of strategies of behavior and communication in science becomes fundamentally important. This analysis guarantees independence from the danger of becoming very dependent on the extra-science components of the mentioned normativity, which is inevitably allocated in practical implementation.

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