Foundations of knowledge in the context of the “linguistic turn”: A transcendental-pragmatic approach

The work is dedicated to the ideas of Karl-Otto Apel. This thinker argues that the conditionality of cognition by language and culture, revealed by modern philosophy, does not deny the possibility of the existence of universal truths. The article deals with the question of whether the concept developed by Apel can be considered a satisfactory solution to the problem of relativism in the theory of knowledge. The core of Apel’s philosophy is transcendental pragmatics he developed. Its specificity lies in the fact that, while maintaining the orientation towards the search for the necessary conditions for cognition, it reveals structures in language and communication that generate the intersubjective significance of knowledge. that ensures the general significance of cognition. At first glance, the concept Apel developed solves the problem of relativism in epistemology. However, this theory raises a number of criticisms. Firstly, in discussing the question of the necessary conditions for objective knowledge, Apel interprets the “objective” in the spirit of the hermeneutic tradition as a general understanding of the meaning of a certain state of affairs or a general view of a certain subject. Apel considers the question of how it is possible to achieve a common view of things between representatives of different cultures. Following the notion of linguistic philosophy about the linguistic nature of being and thinking, Apel remains within the framework of the idea of cognition as an essentially historical and relative process. Secondly, transcendental pragmatics undertakes the substantiation of the ultimate principles of cognition in the horizon of the language game of the Kantian theory of cognition and the normative prescriptions for scientific cognition put forward by classical New European epistemology. In the author’s opinion, Apel ontologizes the methodological guidelines of the modernist theory of knowledge. This is manifested in the fact that the principles of argumentative, aimed at rational discussion, discourse are thought of as a necessary condition for any meaningful communication. According to the author, argumentative discourse is, first, only one of the types of social communication, and, second, it is not a condition of any communication, but a normative ideal, first of all, of discussing problems in scientific communities. Thus, summing up the above and answering the question posed at the beginning of this work, it can be concluded that transcendental pragmatics does not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem of relativism in the theory of knowledge. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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