The boundaries of science and the formation of the identity of scientific knowledge

The topic of the boundaries of science has been discussed in diverse variations. However, understanding the historicity of forms of scientific rationality, relativization and changes in the ways scientific knowledge is produced, and changes in the relationship between science and society inevitably lead to the need to address the problem of the identity of science and to identify the cognitive and social foundations of the slippage of its boundaries. The idea of the boundaries of science depends on the model of science adopted, on its specific historical localization, and on the choice of its aspect of consideration. Science is studied in three main dimensions: science as a system of knowledge, which is characterized by a constant pursuit of truth; science as an activity; and science as a social institution that regulates the relationship between the scientific community, society, and nature. The post-positivist philosophy of science has developed two main aspects of the study of science: cognitive (intra-scientific parameters of the growth of scientific knowledge, internal boundaries) and social and cultural (the relationship of science with other social institutions, external boundaries). It is advisable to consider the problem of boundaries of science by specifying the contexts in which models of science are formed, and depending on the image of science that is “grasped” in this particular dimension of science as a complex self-developing system of knowledge and social and cultural phenomenon, to present ways of identifying science. Thus, for example, the images of science reconstructed by historical epistemology are actively discussed. Another context for the discussion of the boundaries of science is formed around the problem of the relativization of scientific knowledge. Equally important is the context of the emergence of transdisciplinary studies of technoscience. The sociology of scientific knowledge forms the context of “boundary-work” designated by Thomas F. Gieryn. The problem of boundary-work also affects the problems of the method of describing and defining science. Under conditions of inter- and transdisciplinarity and complex thinking the boundaries are erased, and the justification of the demarcation between “science” and “non-science” is questioned. These modern contexts actualize the concept o“boundaries of science”, which requires a new philosophical and methodological reading. The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

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