Rorty and the fear of influence (How to avoid being secondary)

The article presents a commentary on Sergey Smirnov’s review of my book on the philosophy of Richard Rorty. When considering the evolution of views - from relativism, the “assimilation” of the historian of science Thomas Kuhn, the “adaptation” of the continental thinkers Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida to the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer -of the “landmark beacons” noted by Smirnov, I have added another one, namely, the “fear of influence” by Harold Bloom. A number of examples are shown of how Rorty’s overcoming of such influence can be presented as a way of identifying both Rorty himself and his philosophy. A striking example of Rorty’s efforts to avoid being “secondary” is his attitude to the work of Kuhn, who deals with the history of physics, while Rorty deals with philosophical discourse. Rorty tried to avoid this dilemma by resorting to attempts to combine these discourses, but without accepting the accepted hierarchy of sciences, in which philosophy occupies a subordinate place. It is for these reasons that Rorty escaped from the influence of Kuhn, after which he is characterized by great ambitions, since he speaks on behalf of cultural policy, which Rorty calls “philosophy”. An even more striking example of how Rorty overcomes his “secondariness” is given. It is Gadamer’s and Heidegger’s influence on Rorty, and his acceptance of hermeneutics instead of epistemology. Rorty’s demonstrative preference for hermeneutic conversations in this spirit of argumentation in an epistemological way demonstrated the obvious secondary nature of Rorty. Feeling this burden, Rorty tries to get rid of the fear of influence. A new understanding of his goals requires new arguments from Rorty, already directed against hermeneutics. He finds them in Donald Davidson’s polemic with Charles Taylor. The fact is that Rorty discards the old concept of interpretation, “inscribed on the banners of the philosophical movement” represented by Dilthey, Gadamer, and Taylor, replacing it with a more subtle concept of “recontextualization”. Thus, there can be no “total”, or, as Rorty says, universal hermeneutics! The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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