On the possible existence of private physical objects

The article discusses the possible existence of private physical objects. The term “private physical object” refers to a hypothetical physical object, which is directly observable for just one (and only) agent (and I regard this constraint as being of purely metaphysical nature). At the beginning of the article, I investigate the issue of the correct application of the “privacy constraint” to physical objects, and the issue of compatibility of this constraint with all standard universal characteristics of physical objects, including the following: to exist independently of subjects (independently of language, thought, apprehension, knowledge, etc.), to be at least indirectly observable, to possess properties, to stand in relations to one another, to be concrete (to be non-abstract, to exist in space and time, to have causes and to have effects). I show that publicity is not a constitutive property of physical objects. In the second part of the article, I aim to provide a satisfactory criterion of identity for private physical objects. I show that being private and having an identity criterion are not incompatible conditions. I consider two main models of the identity criterion - a one-level criterion of identity and a two-level criterion of identity - and several examples of universal diachronic identity criteria for physical objects. Using these models of identity criterion along with the examples of universal diachronic identity criteria for physical objects, I formulate an exemplary identity criterion for private physical objects. I also consider some features of the comparison procedure for private physical objects. I demonstrate that for any private physical objects only indirect intersubjective comparison procedures are allowed. I conclude that private physical objects can have all standard universal characteristics of physical objects, and that it is possible to provide a satisfactory criterion of identity for private physical objects, which, in turn, proves the fallacy of the thesis that being private and having an identity criterion are incompatible conditions. Therefore, one can consistently consider private physical objects as possible entities. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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