The "Standard Liar": Wittgenstein, Language-Games and Self-Reference
The article critically examines the heuristic capacity and methods of using separate tools of Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar to treat various semantic pathologies (paradoxes of Liar, Truth-Teller, etc.). According to Wittgenstein, philosophical confusion associated with the analysis of such semantic pathologies arises on the grounds of our intuitive faith that we are able to express in language any property that interests us. For instance, we believe that the property "to have a length of exactly one metre" can be meaningfully attributed to any extended object. However, such a faith is fundamentally wrong, since an object like a standard metre, which plays an exclusive role as the criterion of length in our measuring practices based on the metric system, is an example of an extended object about which one can say neither that it is one metre long, nor that it is not one metre long. A correct understanding of the language-game concept shows that the criterion by which we form a set of objects that meet the standards established by the criterion cannot be described in the same way as objects of this set. Language-games using predicates of truth and falsehood are similar to our practice of measuring length using the metric system. In cases of Liar and Truth-Teller sentences, we encounter resembling examples of philosophical confusion. Beyond the context of their usage, "This sentence is false" and "This sentence is true" sentences seem to us paradoxes. But, according to Wittgenstein's philosophical grammar, a correct method of treating such "paradoxical" sentences demands to find the lacking context for their usage, i.e. pay attention to the language-game in which they are emplloyed. Like in the case of the standard metre, we can claim that the sentence "This sentence is false" ("This sentence is true") is neither false (true), nor not false (true). In an analogous way, Liar and Truth-Teller sentences should be interpreted as peculiar standards of falsehood and truth that we use in our language-games to judge about the truth value of other sentences.
Keywords
семантический парадокс,
парадокс Лжеца,
языковая игра,
самореференция,
самопредикация,
semantic paradox,
liar paradox,
language-game,
self-reference,
self-predicationAuthors
| Nekhaev Andrei V. | Tyumen State University; Omsk State Technical University; Tomsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences | A_V_Nehaev@rambler.ru |
Всего: 1
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