Analysing nuclear latency: variables and constants
The article discusses the role of variables and constants in analysing the nuclear factor in world politics, in particular, the so-called threshold states and their behaviour. In a brief section devoted to terminology, definitions of the corresponding notions are given. A literature review makes it possible to single out various approaches to utilising the mentioned terms in studying the nuclear latency phenomenon in different IRT (International Relations Theory) schools as well as the existing gaps. While choosing nuclear latency per se as a dependent, measurable variable, the work features an account of independent variables as well as constants that have an impact on threshold states' policies in the nuclear realm. Among the independent variables the following are presented: global context (international milieu), domestic political situation, as well as political will of the decision-makers, the latter largely being a function of the previous two components. The first variable is an external one whereas the second and third ones belong to internal variables. Such indicators as credibility of positive security assurances and power asymmetry are at the interface of the internal and external variables. Constants, in turn, include the current status of nuclear technologies at a national level, as well as the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Defining the listed values allows one to adequately explain the choices of threshold states in favour of retaining a highly developed NFC (nuclear fuel cycle) while simultaneously successfully attempting to attain additional security guarantees from the NWS (nuclear-weapon state) responsible for providing its ”nuclear umbrella”. To validate his theoretical theses, the author resorts to the case studies from the Asia-Pacific threshold states (Commonwealth of Australia, Japan, and Republic of Korea). An inference is presented regarding the ambivalent nature of nuclear latency as a state, which can be viewed from different angles both as a variable and even as a constant that influences security politics at national, regional and global scales. The author declares no conflicts of interests.
Keywords
variables,
constants,
nuclear latency,
threshold states,
Asia-PacificAuthors
| Toropchin Gleb V. | Novosibirsk State Technical University; Tomsk State University | glebtoropchin@mail.ru |
Всего: 1
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