An analysis of the problem of scepticism regarding meaning in terms of linguistic pragmatics

In this work, I show the perspectives revealed for an analysis of the problem of scepticism regarding meaning (“Kripke’s problem”) using the categories of linguistic pragmatics (performativity, the distinction of locution, illocution and perlocution). I provide a critical analysis of the argumentation against scepticism proposed by Vsevolod A. Ladov and Evgeny V. Borisov, who appeal to performative contradiction ascribed by them to sceptical discourse. With extrapolation of this style of argumentation to the discussion of scepticism in general, I show its vulnerability in light of the counter-argument from sceptical illocution proposed in the present work. Taking into account the polemic discussion spread out around the “straight solution” in the literature, I point out that knowledge of meaning by introspection, postulated by Borisov, should be understood as a performative establishment of meaning in individual speech acts (thus, the notion of performativity arises once again in his argumentation). I propose and substantiate the opinion that the appeal to such performativity is not a full-aspect solution for the problem. Addressing the distinction of locution, illocution and perlocution allows analysing the problem of scepticism regarding meaning in a new perspective, posing the question: What aspect of meaning - locutive, illocutive or perlocutive -is concerned? I propose and explicate the hypothesis that objectivity and stability of meanings is maintained by the perlocutive aspect of speech; that does not exclude relativity and fluidity of reconstruction of meanings in the illocutive aspect. The author thanks G.A. Zolotkov and A.Yu. Moiseeva for an interesting and fruitful discussion of the ideas that formed the basis of this work. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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