The riddle of subjective representations
The article is dedicated to the 95th anniversary of Felix Mikhailov, a famous Soviet and Russian philosopher and psychologist, who put forward an original concept that claims to explain the whole range of problems associated with human subjectivity: the nature and representational character of subjective images, the origins of thought and creativity, their determination by culture, the autonomy of the individual and the uniqueness of the Self. The author shows that the ideas he expressed fit organically, in particular, into modern discussions about the nature and representational character of phenomenal consciousness. The importance of considering the apparent randomness of the relationship between phenomenal experience and represented entities is emphasized. The author analyzes the relationship between neural activity and phenomenal experience, suggesting that it is internal processing models, rather than external content, that have a decisive influence on it. Historical debates about the representational character of qualia, which continue to influence modern theories, are discussed. An argument from personal experience, related to the use of color markers when working with texts, is presented, which shows that color differences can represent perceptual patterns rather than objects themselves. An approach from the viewpoint of the possibility of turning representational content into propositional one is also analyzed, which can serve as an argument against the representational character of phenomenal images. The author discusses not only philosophical issues, but also possible empirical paradigms for the study of unconscious qualia, emphasizing the complexity and diversity of the interaction between sensory data and consciousness. The heuristic role of sensory substitution studies for philosophical problems is also considered. These discussions contribute to a deeper understanding of the role of subjective images in perceptual experience. The author declares no conflicts of interests.
Keywords
qualia,
representation,
phenomenal experience,
perception,
color,
unconscious,
sensory substitutionAuthors
| Mikhailov Igor F. | Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences | ifmikhailov@iphras.ru |
Всего: 1
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