The role of logical honesty in overcoming cognitive biases: an epistemological approach

This article addresses the epistemological problem of cognitive biases - systematic errors in human reasoning that significantly distort the acquisition, justification, and communication of knowledge. Drawing on recent research in psychology and epistemology, the study focuses on three widespread biases: confirmation bias, belief bias, and the framing effect. These distortions lead to epistemically flawed inferences, undermine logical consistency, and often resist rational correction, thus posing a fundamental threat to intellectual integrity. The aim of this study is to examine the concept of logical honesty as a possible solution to this problem. Introduced in a previous work by the author, logical honesty is defined as a relational-procedural epistemic virtue that integrates three key dimensions: formal rationality (logical rigor), ethical responsibility (truth-directed motivation), and metacognitive reflexivity (awareness of one’s epistemic fallibility and commitment to self-correction). This virtue is explored here as both an individual discipline and a normatively guided practice that enhances the reliability and integrity of reasoning processes. The study is theoretical and conceptual in nature. It synthesizes philosophical accounts of epistemic virtues - especially in the works of Linda Zagzebski and Jason Baehr - with findings from cognitive psychology. Through conceptual analysis, the article reconstructs the structure of logical honesty and examines its function as an epistemic defense mechanism against distortions of reasoning. In particular, it shows how logical honesty counteracts cognitive biases by promoting critical self-evaluation, open-mindedness, intellectual accountability, and logical discipline. The main body of the article analyzes how logical honesty addresses specific distortions. In the case of confirmation bias, it encourages systematic testing of counterevidence and correction of motivated reasoning. Against belief bias, it emphasizes logical validity over intuitive plausibility. Regarding the framing effect, it fosters reflective distance from rhetorical manipulations. In each case, logical honesty operates not only as a moral commitment but also as a practical method of improving epistemic reliability. The article concludes that logical honesty is not a formal norm or a stable personal trait, but a situationally activated epistemic virtue. It becomes relevant precisely in moments of cognitive tension and epistemic uncertainty - when the subject must choose between comfort and truth. In this way, logical honesty emerges as a core condition for epistemic maturity and a reliable defense against bias-driven fallacies in both individual and collective reasoning. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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