Political connections of heads of budgetary organizations in modern Russia
This study examines the political connections of leaders in Russian state universities and cultural institutions, positioning them as mid-level bureaucrats within the administrative hierarchy. Using a dataset of 555 university rectors and 232 heads of cultural organizations (museums, theaters, libraries, and philharmonics), the research reveals that 55% of university rectors and 46% of cultural institution leaders possess institutionalized ties to political parties, government bodies, or state-affiliated corporations. These findings challenge the official narrative of apolitical governance in education and culture, highlighting systemic politicization of budgetary institutions. Methodologically, the study combines open-source data analysis with regression modeling to assess correlations between political connections and variables such as gender, tenure duration, and organizational status. Key results include the following. Male leaders are significantly more likely to have political capital (57% of male rectors vs. 46% of female rectors). Longer leadership tenure correlates with stronger political ties, suggesting cumulative network-building. Universities under federal oversight (57%) and “elite” institutions (e.g., Project 5-100, 76%) exhibit higher politicization. Cultural organizations in Moscow/St. Petersburg (53%) also show similar results. The study contributes to debates on bureaucratic autonomy by demonstrating how political connections mediate resource allocation and institutional loyalty in Russia’s context. It calls for further research on the paradox of political capital, that is, enhancing funding access while potentially undermining professional independence. The author declares no conflicts of interests.
Keywords
Russia,
bureaucracy,
rectors,
heads of cultural organizations,
political connectionsAuthors
| Gerashchenko Daria R. | European University at Saint Petersburg; HSE University | dgeraschenko@eu.spb.ru |
Всего: 1
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