Example and correctness of the rule

The article discusses Nekhaev’s analysis of the rule-following problem through his reception of semantic Platonism (SP) and semantic dispositionalism (SD). The analysis is based on two main premises. First, that SD position, even being based on a closed observable set of elementary (simple) dispositions, cannot advocate for a solid reason for “privilege” of complex dispositions. Second, that SP approach enables us to formulate an exclusive rule to unambiguously follow solely by decomposing a paradigmatic example. Based on this, Nekhaev prefers SP over SD claiming a better heuristic potential of the former. I argue that both basic premises are false. The privilege argument does not persist if we allow a checking operation: probability and common sense naturally privilege the “true” function over “false” ones. Decomposition, in turn, cannot provide us with a proper operation or function to continue a random given sequence. To do this, it must contain a framing criterion, which happens to be arbitrary. Consequently, SP of this kind fails to the privilege argument even harder than SD. In arithmetic calculations we do not struggle with framing since the very same shift in radix could be counted as such - and every shift may be described as a unique function over the space of all possible pairing combinations exceeding the basis. But the nature of “analogical reasoning” prevents us from building such space. As I point out in the article, acting analogically exempts us from any inherent property of the paradigmatic example unless the ruling formula is explicitly given. Dispositionalism here may only describe a status quo, Platonism a coherent way of analogy construction. Hence, the way Nekhaev presents both approaches makes it pointless to juxtapose them and opt between them since they merely address the same question. SP tackles the question of foundations for any consistent convention while SD concerns factual rule-following problems even with a solid formal foundation. Neither Platonism, nor dispositionalism shows us a flawless solution. Moreover, we shall combine both approaches to tackle the rulefollowing problem in its entirety. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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